DEFENSE REFORM IN TURKEY

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Post-Cold War Defense Reform: Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States
East West Institute, Brassey's, New York
2003

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. In the Cold War, its armed forces were geared to play a significant role in defense of the Western alliance according to NATO’s military doctrine and strategy. As a longstanding NATO ally, Turkey, today, is not facing any serious problems regarding, standardization, interoperability or military infrastructure. Apart from its NATO obligations, Ankara has maintained its regional perspective on security problems. In the post-Cold War era, NATO assumed new responsibilities such as peace-support operations beside its original function of collective defense. The strategic environment around Turkey has completely changed. The Soviet threat has faded away. New security challenges such as separatism, irredentism, terrorism, threats to energy security, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have emerged. While its firm commitment to collective defense continues, Turkey had to adapt its security and defense policy and its armed forces to the changing regional strategic setting as well as to the Alliance’s new functions. Because of its regional geopolitics, Turkey has somewhat a distinctive position within the Atlantic Alliance. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), therefore, planned and carried out reforms with a view to maintaining the capability to operate either with the allied countries or alone. The reform and modernization program of the TAF has been to a considerable extent successful despite economic difficulties poor R&D, and the continuation of the conscription system. One of the intractable problems, however, has been the military’s paradoxical role in politics. This issue has recently come to the forefront as a result of Turkey’s EU candidacy. Turkey also needs more transparency in its defense budgeting. The unsatisfactory level of democratic

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control over the military results, however, not only from the assertiveness of the military, but also, and probably more, from the general circumstances of Turkish politics. Nevertheless, some Progress has recently been recorded in this field too.

**Changing Security Environment**

In the Cold War, the NATO doctrine focused on the central front as the main area of the Soviet-Warsaw Pact Threat. The contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western Europe was the fundamental assumption. Turkey’s contribution was considered in function of such a contingency. Turkish army, largest in NATO after the United States, tied down around thirty Warsaw Pact divisions. Without Turkish alignment, the Soviets would be able to concentrate more massively against the central front. Secondly, Turkish membership of NATO exposed vast areas in the USSR to Western monitoring. Thirdly, Turkey and the alliance controlled the Straits and the Aegean passages. Turkey’s neutralization (followed by that of Greece) would shift NATO’s defensive line in the Mediterranean back to Italy and to the line from Sicily to Cape Bon, further complicating the Western defense posture in Europe.

In time of war, Turkey would have to engage the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces in two theaters, the Thrace-Straits area and Eastern Turkey where it shared a 610 kilometer common border with the Soviet Union. Only in Finnmark area of northern Norway did another NATO ally shared a frontier with the USSR. Turkey was the only NATO member facing the Warsaw Pact threat from two opposing directions. In return to these risks and its contribution to the European balance of military forces, Ankara enjoyed NATO’s collective defense commitment and received military and economic assistance mainly from the United States and, to a much lesser extent, from Germany. Moreover, NATO greatly contributed to the modernization of its military infrastructure.

After the Cold War, this strategic arrangement ceased to satisfy the requirements of the new era. As a result of the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the center of gravity of security challenges shifted from the central front to NATO’s southern region. The collapse of the communist system opened the Pandora’s Box of the old and relatively new conflicts. The proliferation of the WMD, terrorist activities, multiplication of sub-state entities and paramilitary groups within states added to the feeling of insecurity and uncertainty in the region. Regional instabilities as well as opportunities led to a new perspective in Ankara’s foreign and security policy,
encouraging it to assume a relatively active role in the Balkans, the Black Sea basin, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.

The most drastic change, however, has been the demise of the Soviet threat. The most striking outcome of this development was that, for the first time in the four-century-old history of Turco-Russian rivalry, the two nations were being geographically separated by the emergence of new independent states. Dissolution of common borders with the Russian power contributed greatly to the security in Turkey. Moreover, conventional force reductions that were achieved with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty improved the disproportionate situation between the two states in the area. The radical change in the strategic environment encouraged both states to exploit the vast opportunities that exist for mutual economic relations. The most recent development in Turkish-Russian rapprochement is the “Action Plan” on cooperation in Eurasian that was signed between the two states on November 16, 2001 in New York. The document which is entitled “From Bilateral Cooperation to Multidimensional Partnership” stresses that the two countries are determined to move their existing relations into an enhanced partnership in every area from the Balkans to the Middle East.

Similarly, Ankara has also developed close cooperative relationships with Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Turkey, in pursuance of NATO’s PfP objectives, has carried out special military training and educational programs and contributed to the improvement of military infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Through the initiation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation scheme in 1992, Turkey added a regional multilateral dimension to its efforts of bilateral cooperation. However, while the Karabagh dispute remains unsettled and 20 % of Azerbaijan’s territory is under Armenia’s occupation, a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement do not seem possible in the near future.

Despite the recent dissipation of tension between Greece and Turkey, the Aegean and Cyprus disputes continue to spoil relations between these two NATO allies. Nevertheless, thanks to their NATO membership and the crisis-management skills they successfully developed over the years of rivalry, tensions and occasional crises in the Aegean and Cyprus have been intelligently prevented from escalating to a war. Under the present conditions, a war between Turkey and Greece does not seem to be of high probability.
Turkey’s joining the coalition against the Saddam regime has underlined its importance in the maintenance of regional security and stability. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, however, the demise of the Iraqi central authority in the north of the 36th parallel complicated Turkey’s security considerations. The region became a sanctuary for the PKK terrorists who began to operate from northern Iraq against military and civilian targets inside Turkey. On the other hand, during the first days of the Gulf War, Turkey was confronted with the threat of mass migration of more than 500,000 Iraqi Kurds who crossed the Turkish border in order to escape from the Saddam regime. Ankara averted this major problem with the help of the allied humanitarian operation called “Provide Comfort” which insured the fleeing Kurdish population’s safe return to their homes in northern Iraq. Furthermore, Syria’s active support of the PKK also constituted a very serious security challenge for Turkey until 1998 when the former gave up its support under the latter’s military pressure.

As a consequence of these developments and the PKK terrorism in the region, military planners in Ankara shifted their attention from Turkey’s northern borders to the southern and eastern borders adjacent to Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and redeployed the military units accordingly. In less than a decade, Turkey’s troop deployments in the region increased almost five folds from a figure like 60 thousand infantry and gendarmerie troops in the early 1990s. Beside the numerical increase, the quality of the troops, including special forces, also improved. Moreover, new equipment such as light and heavy artillery, armored vehicles and attack helicopters were sent to the region, enabling the military to wage cross-border operations in northern Iraq. These deployments have been possible due to the fact that the CFE Treaty does not cover southeastern Turkey, an exceptional arrangement which has increased Ankara’s freedom of action in the area (See the map and Table I).

**Defense Policy and Strategy**

Currently, Turkey’s defense policy objectives can be summarized as (1) protection of political independence and territorial integrity of the country, including the secular regime of the Republic; (2) contributing to the creation of a favorable international and regional milieu of security and stability. It is to be underlined that these two objectives comprise not only international tasks, but also a fairly broad internal mission which will be briefly examined in a separate section of the present paper. Moreover, the defense policy does not confine itself to a narrow mission of
protection of frontier and territorial integrity. It also assumes the responsibility of contributing to regional security and stability, which became a clear policy objective after the Cold War. In terms of the **White Book 2000** of the Ministry of National Defense, the defense policy objectives are pursued through a military strategy that consists of deterrence, forward defense, military contribution to crisis management and intervention in crises, and collective security/defense.

### Table I  Turkey’s Conventional Weapons Arsenal in Five Categories As Limited by the CFE Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main Battle Tank</th>
<th>Armored Pers. Carr.</th>
<th>Artillery</th>
<th>Attack Helicopter</th>
<th>Combat Aircraft</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3,234</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>575,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2,608</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>3,102</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>2,552</td>
<td>3,101</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>525,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>2,953</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>515,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE Ceiling</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>3,523</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>530,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,591*</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>10,257*</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>470*</td>
<td>551,000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Out of this total number of main battle tanks, including 386 of Mustafa Kemal-48A5 type that are deployed in the TRNC, 1,300 of Mustafa Kemal-48 A5T1/T2 types are reportedly to be stored. The Military Balance: 2001-2002, p. 73.

### Deterrence and Forward Defense

The **White Book 2000** states that “maintaining a military force that will provide a deterrent influence on the centers of risk and threat in the environment of instability and uncertainty surrounding Turkey constitutes the foundation of the national military strategy”.

For deterrence, Turkey relies not only on NATO, but also on its own capabilities to balance other powers in the region.

Turkey’s defense strategy, however, is no longer confined to mere deterrence, it also consists of the elimination of imminent threats stemming from the region in general. This forward defense strategy requires preparation to preempt threats before they cross onto Turkish territory. The modernization program and reform are geared to provide the Turkish Armed Forces with such a capability. For this purpose, the recent
procurement of 7 KC-135 tanker aircraft has considerably extended the range of the 223 F-16 fighters, enabling the air force to carry out missions abroad. The air force also has increased its lift capability by establishing five transport squadrons with C-130, C-160, and CN 235 aircraft. Current plans for the purchase of AEW-C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) aircraft will further enhance the effectiveness of Turkish air power.

The Turkish navy also is being modernized in conformity with its new missions required by the changing circumstances of the post-Cold War era. The modernization efforts are transforming the Turkish navy from a coastal one to a blue water navy that can effectively operate in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea with comparatively enhanced capabilities of mobility and power projection. Apart from its war time missions such as strategic deterrence, sea control, and participation in allied or coalition operations, the navy’s peace time missions can be summarized as follows: maintenance of deterrence through its presence and exercises in the adjacent seas; control and protection of the SLOCs, refugee control, humanitarian aid, search and rescue, environmental protection, operations against terrorism and organized crime.

Due to its high degree of maneuverability and its advanced communication and other electronic capabilities, allowing sufficient time and flexibility to political and military decision-makers, the navy is regarded as a very useful instrument of crisis-management as well. The Turkish and, indeed Greek, navies’ crisis-management capabilities were conspicuously observable during the Kardak/Imia crisis in the Aegean Sea in 1996. Both governments wisely kept their respective air forces standing by, but instead, they relied on their navies. This provided them with a high degree of flexibility and possibilities of communication facilitating de-escalation of the crisis.

The blue water component of the Turkish navy has become more and more visible through the gradual procurement of modern frigates, patrol craft, submarines, auxiliaries and naval air assets. This process has gained momentum during the last decade.

The navy, which initially had defensive littoral warfare capabilities, acquired, after 1950, some ASW capabilities and submarines. After 1970, it added to its inventory guided missile patrol boats and more submarines. During the same period, the navy’s strength increased by the procurement of naval aviation, landing craft and ships. The aim of the ongoing modernization program is to renew the existing forces,
to strike a balance between forces and force multipliers, and improve the integrated surveillance and reconnaissance capability with modern C3I links.\textsuperscript{4}

In the words of the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, “The land forces have emerged as the highest priority power”.\textsuperscript{5} Although a number of changes are being made in the force structure of the land forces, the main organizational structure that depends on numerous combat brigades and corps is maintained. However, the Land Forces Command takes steps to decrease operating and maintenance costs without reducing the effectiveness of the military power. In order to use resources more efficiently and, at the same time, to keep the effectiveness of the military force, it is deemed necessary to increase intra-theater mobility by having “centrally deployed troops which will be used in every region” and “equipped with high-tech weapons and systems”. Another change which is considered indispensable for the reduction of the size of the forces is the improvement of command and control, reconnaissance, surveillance and communications through the introduction of more information-age technologies.\textsuperscript{6}

These reforms, however, would require a new personnel policy aiming at the creation of a more professional army. Although, at present, the Turkish armed forces have a mixed system with professional officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and civilian employees combined with a conscription system applied to reserve officers and enlisted soldiers, the General Staff (TGS) is conducting studies for a transition to a more professional army. The personnel reform will begin by the professionalization of all the officer cadres by completely filling them with professional contract personnel and abolishing the reserve officer system that is based on conscription.\textsuperscript{7}

The Land Forces Personnel Directorate has recently established a Human Resources Selection and Evaluation Center Command to recruit the high-quality personnel by employing modern scientific testing and evaluation methods. Another step taken by the Land Forces to improve the skills of young officers has been to send them to civilian universities for graduate studies in such fields as management, engineering, international relations, and finance. This has been considered an additional method useful to meet the requirements not easily met through the military school education. This practice is an initial step taken to reduce the military’s monopoly on military education.
Nevertheless, the Land Forces Command is in favor of a phased and slow transition to a fully professional army. They argue that the economic and demographic conditions of the country as well as the multiplicity of threats and the country’s strategic location do not allow a rapid abolition of the conscription system (See Table I). They also emphasize that the country’s manpower sources provide the armed forces with a great advantage by enabling them to recruit sufficient numbers of soldiers according to changing military circumstances. These views seem to be approved by the TGS.8

**Countering The Threat of WMD**

Whereas the end of the Cold War created a sense of relief of the danger of nuclear catastrophe, the threat of worldwide proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles as their delivery vehicles, did soon eradicate the hopes for a more stable and peaceful world order. Unlike the bipolar international system where the threat of nuclear annihilation was menacing but stability could be maintained thanks to the nuclear deterrence, the post-Cold War era is characterized with highly destabilizing factors such as the emergence of states as well as non-state actors (i.e., terrorist and militia group, cults etc.) having strong ambitions to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Turkey is neighboring a number of such states (and other entities) that are on the short list of most notorious proliferants in the world, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria who are believed to have chemical and biological weapons stockpiles and doing serious work on nuclear weapons. Turkey is also within range of delivery vehicles (ballistic missiles) deployed in those neighboring countries. One might therefore expect that, in the face of such a threat, Turkey would soon embark on a crash program to develop its own WMD capability. Nevertheless, relying on NBC weapons development as an effective deterrent or a countermeasure is, as has always been the case, out of question for Turkey. Rather, Turkey has persistently pursued a policy to become a state party to international non-proliferation agreements that sought to curb the spread of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles.9 Turkey fulfills with great care its liabilities stemming from the international documents like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).10 One particular reason for Turkey to give its utmost support to
international efforts made for strengthening the existing international non-proliferation regimes, is the widespread belief among the Turkish security elite that effective verification mechanisms of NBC non-proliferation treaties might create serious impediments to aspiring states in their engagements with WMD development and thus might provide strong assurances to Turkey in its relations with its neighbors. This expectation, however, has not been fulfilled.

Thus, in order to counter the threat posed by its Middle Eastern neighbors, Turkey believes it has a number of advantages. First, it has long relied on the positive security assurances provided by the Atlantic Alliance. NATO's deterrent is still considered by Turkey to be effective with respect to the threat posed by NBC-capable states in its immediate neighborhood. Secondly, it relies on a forward defense strategy (the land-air doctrine) that is believed to provide enough credibility to deter even unconventional armed attacks from its neighbors.

As such, in the second half of 1990s, the Turkish military has become capable of launching overnight a comprehensive land operation with the involvement of around 50 thousand troops fully equipped. Added to this, the air power capability can well provide the troops on the ground with close air support. Early warning aircraft as well as refuelling aircraft that are entering the inventory of the Turkish air force increase both the range and the operational capability of the combating aircraft involved in operations. Hence, the overall operational capability of the ground forces in combination with the air units is considered to give Turkey the capability to invade parts of the territory of the enemy, if need be, in a considerably short time. What needs to be done at this stage is the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the technical passive defense equipment and protective gear needed against a possible chemical and biological attack. Necessary measures are being taken in this respect. Thus, the invasion capability of Turkey in retaliation is believed to constitute a credible deterrent against its southern neighbors which may contemplate attacking Turkey with WMD.

Furthermore, its comprehensive cooperation in the field of military relations with Israel and the United States provide Turkey with the opportunity of creating a missile shield in its territory. Relations between Turkey and Israel are improving especially since the upgrading of diplomatic relations on both sides that followed Israel’s peace initiatives with the PLO and Jordan in late 1995 and onwards. Furthermore, the Turkish-Israeli relations have entered a new phase with the military cooperation agreement signed in 1996 and much improved since then. The text of the
agreement does apparently include clauses for improving bilateral military cooperation. For instance, the Israeli military aircraft are allowed to overfly the Turkish territory for training. And, Israel, on the other hand, agreed to upgrade 54 Turkish F-4 class military aircraft and to provide the Turkish Airforce with electronic warfare equipment. The significance of the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel goes beyond these usual transactions and reflects a new element of power politics in the Middle East.

The US proposal to establish a “missile shield” in the eastern districts of Turkey at the bilateral level or in the NATO framework, or at trilateral level with the inclusion of Israel may be seen as indicators of an emerging defense bloc among the three countries. Although too early to identify it as a formal pact, Turkey, Israel and the United States may join their forces to counter the threat of ballistic missiles that may be tipped with WMD warheads. The recent military exercise called the “Anatolian Eagle” that took place in central Anatolia in early July 2001 with the participation of air force units of Turkey, Israel and the United States and the air defense systems of these countries, simulated defense as well as combat operations against a comprehensive attack from the air. Furthermore, the Council of Ministers has recently decided to purchase the Israeli cruise missiles (popeye II) with a range of 200 kilometers.

This advanced military cooperation among Turkey, US and Israel seem to be contrary to what Turkey long pursued during the Cold War as to not to get involved in US plans designed specifically to back up Israel. However, the threat of WMD and ballistic missiles is becoming an issue of common concern, and it is quite normal for the Turkish security elite to seek for a reliable defense posture and a credible deterrent beyond merely the NATO context.

Another option for a joint missile defense could be offered by the US National missile Defense (NMD) and NATO’s Theater Missile Defense (TMD) projects. A missile defense architecture for Turkey could be developed by the deployment of ground-, sea- and air-based boost-phase intercept systems in the country. Turkey’s participation in such a defensive system would, to a great extent, satisfy Ankara’s security needs stemming from the proliferation of WMDs and missiles. The boost-phase systems should be less threatening to Russia, because their range would not be sufficient to intercept Russian missile launches in their boost-phase. Although neither Washington nor Ankara have taken a decision in this respect, Turkish defense
experts have begun to seriously consider this option which would be practicable if the US (and NATO’s) conception of ballistic missile defense and Turkey’s missile defense architecture should complement each other.16

**Peace Support Operations**

After the Cold War, Turkish Armed Forces began to pay particular attention to regional cooperative security and peace support operations, including diverse missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Turkey actively participated in peace support operations in Somalia and the Balkans. It also contributed to various peace observations missions. The TLF were assigned to UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the brigade level. In December 1995, they were assigned to SFOR. The Navy participated in “Operation Sharp Guard” in the Adriatic, whose mission was to monitor and impose an arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. In April 1993, the Air Force joined NATO’s “Operation Deny Flight” with a F-16 squadron operating from Italy’s Ghedi air base to enforce the no-flight zone over Bosnia and to protect “safe areas”. During the Kosovo crisis, Ankara contributed a mechanized infantry battalion as well as headquarters personnel to KFOR. Moreover, three Special Operations Teams were sent to Kosova to join the Hostage Rescue Force. An F-16 squadron was also assigned to NATO’s “Operation Allied Force” in Kosova.17

Although Turkey, as a non-EU NATO ally, cannot fully participate in the decision making process of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), it has informed the EU of its readiness to contribute to the “Headline Goal” a unit at the level of a brigade supported by a sufficient number of air force and navy units.

Turkey’s interest in cooperative security extends from participation in peace support operations to the initiation of regional security arrangements. It assumed a leading role in the formation of the Southeastern Europe Multinational Peace Force (SEEBRIG) and of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR). Turkey also contributes to NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs enthusiastically. It participates in PfP’s military and naval exercises in the region. It also established a PfP Training Center in Ankara.

Peace Support Operations are usually manpower-intensive operations which require diverse skills and special military training for units and individual soldiers. Since TAF are formed mainly by conscripts who serve for only eighteen months, troops assigned to peace support operations are trained specifically for that purpose.
Training programs aim to improve not only their combat skills but also their abilities in public relations and in contributing to public order and security. Peace operation troops are mainly selected from among the candidates who know foreign languages.

For the purpose of facilitating its adaptation and contribution to peace support operations, the TAF created new institutions in its own organization. First, the peace missions were assigned to the 3rd Corps and the 28th Mechanized Brigade. Secondly, the TGS and the each of the three services (land, navy, and air) established “Peacekeeping Departments”.

**Civil-Military Relations**

Civil-military relations have been one of the most intractable issues in Turkey’s process of democratization. Turkey’s candidacy of the EU has focused European attention to the political role of the military. Another contradiction arises from NATO’s new orientation and mission in the post-Cold War era. There is a widely accepted view among NATO members that the function of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs is to orient its participants toward the core democratic values of the Atlantic Alliance. Turkey is active in PfP programs and opened a PfP Training Center in Ankara. Moreover, Turkey’s membership of NATO and other Western institutions, together with its “intercultural” characteristics put it in a unique position to project Western values to the newly independent states. Its democratic deficits, however, complicate its role and ambitions. Therefore, the issue of civil-military relations deserve attention while the limits of military interference with politics require elucidation.

Since the 18th century, the military has been the prime Westernizer. Today, it consider itself as the guardian of the state, established and maintained according to Atatürk’s Republican and secularist principles. In other words, the task of the TAF is to protect the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as its secular character not only against external threats but also against its internal enemies. In the military’s eyes, there are two main internal enemies: one is the militant Islamist movements that threaten the secular character of the state; the other is the separatist movement, represented by the PKK, which constitutes a threat to the territorial integrity. The military, however, carefully distinguish the majority of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens from the PKK, which is regarded as a terrorist organization.
Since the 1980s, when the separatist organization PKK launched its terrorist attacks primarily in the southeastern districts of the country, which soon coupled with deeply-rooted militant Islamic movements, the military assigned the top priority to these threats coming from within. Motivated with the determination to protect the territorial integrity as well as the republican regime, the military launched a campaign that also incorporated elements of psychological warfare aimed to secure as much popular support as possible. These included the in doctrination of the public, using especially the elements of media communication. This has resulted in the involvement of the military in almost all aspects of life in the country. During this period, which lasted about a decade until the mid-1990s, there was not much room to discuss, let alone to criticize, the role of the “saviors” of the country. Nor was there a pressing demand for such a criticism from large segments of the society who have displayed an equal sensitivity to protecting the territorial integrity and the regime.

Toward the late 1980s, and especially the early 1990s, when the PKK benefited from the geopolitical developments in northern Iraq that turned out to be a sanctuary for them, and thus enabled them to intensify their attacks, the morale was considerably low among most Turkish citizens because the military was not viewed to be adequately prepared to fight guerilla warfare with its classical force deployment, war tactics and classical weapons arsenal. Right in the mid-1990s the military took a radical decision to reorganize its force structure and to procure adequate weaponry which had higher mobility and fire-power, such as attack helicopters, light artillery, and armored personnel carriers, as well as hi-tech equipment of all sorts, extending from thermal cameras to global surveillance and intelligence systems, all of which have proved to be highly effective in tracking and destroying the terrorist groups. The struggle against the PKK has provided the TAF with a valuable training opportunity in low-intensity conflicts. These events, together with the success of the military pressure that forced the Syrian regime in 1998 to expel the PKK leader Öcalan from Syria, underlined, in the eyes of the Turkish public, the utility of military power in fighting against terrorism. This perception must have been strengthened even further by the recent war in Afghanistan.

Winning the war against the separatists, in the second half of the 1990s, permitted the military to shift its focus to religious extremists at all fronts from small cells of Hizbullah militants in the countryside to politicians who were claimed to be their masterminds. Only after the elimination of the danger of widespread terrorism,
external threats like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capabilities in the neighboring countries entered the agenda of the National Security Council as items of high priority and immediate concern. Consideration of such threats more seriously started to pull, albeit slowly, the military toward its principal role of defending the regime and the territorial integrity against threats coming from outside. Having put its house in order, and also having acquired the state-of-the-art military assets such as AWACS and refueling aircraft, which empowered the already agile Air Force, the military showed an unprecedented interest to developments in its periphery, namely the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, and contributed significantly to peace-making and peacekeeping operations in these and farther regions. Hence, undergoing a modernization process in its weaponry and re-organizing its command and control structure as well as its force deployment so as to meet effectively the challenges from inside and outside the country, made the Turkish military less dependent on old-fashioned psychological warfare against the “internal enemy” which in the past had augmented its role and thus its weight in domestic politics.

The Turkish military, contrary to most of the armed forces in the Third World, has a “refined concept of autonomy”, by which it controls politicians through constitutional mechanisms. This reflects a certain intention not to undermine the democratic regime by usurping civilian authority. The military has also a considerable public prestige. It enjoys the support of the vast majority of the population, including the media, particularly in its struggle against terrorism, separatism and Islamist extremism.

Turkish legal system specifically charge the armed forces with responsibility for defending not only the country but also the political regime as defined in the constitution. The first three articles of the constitution define the characteristics of the Turkish state. They are irrevocable and their amendments cannot even be proposed. Article 1 stipulates that the Turkish state is a “republic”. Article 2 provides that “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law…” Article 3 declares that the Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law requires the military to assume the duty of protecting and preserving… the Turkish republic as defined in the constitution. The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Directive, more explicitly, refers to the protection of “the republic, by arms when necessary, against internal and external threats”. Another constitutional
mechanism through which the military exercises its influence on political decisions is the National Security Council.

In terms of the Constitution, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) is unequivocally subordinated to the Grand National Assembly (The Parliament), The President and The Prime Minister. The Constitution stipulates that “The Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Council of Ministers; his duties and powers shall be regulated by law. The Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers”. The Ministry of National Defense, however, has an equal status with the TGS. The minister of national defense is usually a civilian, a political figure from the political party in power. Both are subordinated to the Prime Minister. There is only coordination and division of labor between them without any hierarchical order. The Ministry of National Defense is responsible for carrying out the legal, social, financial and budget services of the national defense functions as well as the conscription system. This arrangement diverges from the practice of the allied countries where the chiefs of the general staff are usually subordinated to the ministers of defense.

Although the military is usually encouraged by the public and the existing constitutional and other legal arrangements to maintain its guardianship over the republican order, there is a widespread desire for further democratization in the public. Turkey is also facing considerable pressure from its Western allies for greater democratization. In this context, European leverage has increased since Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. Traditionally being the leading promoter of Turkey’s Western vocation, the armed forces cannot remain insensitive to Western views in the area of democratization.

Important developments have recently taken place in this respect. A prominent improvement was constituted by the exclusion of the military judges and prosecutors from the State Security Courts. President Demirel approved the revision by declaring that the Parliament had rid the country of one of its greatest burdens. Another improvement was about the composition and powers of the National Security Council (NSC). In September 2001, the Parliament modified thirty-four articles of the constitution in order to adapt them to the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU. Under these amendments, the Parliament changed the composition of the NSC by increasing the number of civilian members and reduced the NSC’s recommendatory powers. At
present, the NSC has eight civilian and five military members. As for its powers, the word “decision” in the old text was replaced by “recommendation”; and the sentence “The Council of Ministers shall give priority consideration to the decisions of the NSC…” in the previous text was replaced by the sentence “the Council of Ministers shall evaluate the recommendations of the NSC…”.

Although the military still plays a significant role in political decisions concerning the maintenance of territorial integrity and the secular character of the republican regime, its influence in politics has certain boundaries. Furthermore, limitations imposed upon the military’s political role tend to be gradually more and more effective. The present trend reflects that the military is slowly withdrawing from the political scene. As a student of the Turkish military pertinently points out, “the role of the military in Turkey is the result of a combination of context and circumstance, a symptom rather than a cause of the failure of parliamentary democracy in Turkey to provide stability, prosperity or good governance”. It would not be wrong to argue that, under strong and stable single-party governments, the military’s political influence will be considerably curtailed.

It is worthy to note that there are deeper reasons for the military’s ongoing gradual disengagement from politics. First, in the contemporary era, democratization cannot be disintegrated from Westernization. As the prime agent of Westernization, the military has been increasingly mindful of this historical development since the end of the Second World War. Second, the military knows, by experience, that its involvement in politics leads to an erosion of its officer core’s professionalism as well as to a loss of their prestige, particularly among their colleagues abroad. Third, there is growing pressure for further democratization coming from public opinion and the liberal media, despite the fact that, according to public opinion surveys, the TAFs are viewed by an overwhelming majority of the population (more than 80%) as the most reliable institution in the country. Finally, Turkey’s institutional integration with the West, which began after the Second World War, has gained a new dimension as a result of the country’s EU candidacy. The EU membership is promoting further democratization and it is expected to gradually reduce the role of the military in politics.
Budget and Defense Expenditure

Defense expenditures and resources are determined within the framework of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system which, in general, functions quite effectively. The government assumes the responsibility not only for the preparation of the military budget, but also for the control of payments and contracts by means of the Ministry of Finance. In addition to the governmental control, the auditors of the Court of Public Accounts audit on behalf of the Parliament (The Grand National Assembly) the proper use of all the items of the central government’s consolidated budget to ensure that they are used in accordance with the Budget Law. This political and bureaucratic supervision over the preparation and implementation of the military budget, however, does not necessarily mean that the parliamentary oversight functions adequately.

The resources of defense expenses are composed of the following items (See Table I):

- Allocated resources of the National Defense Budget;
- Resources from the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF);
- Resources from the Turkish Armed Forces Strengthening Foundation (TAFSF);
- Budgets of the Gendarmerie General Command and of the Coast Guard Command;
- Foreign State and company loans repaid from the budget of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury (The US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits have been gradually reduced in the 1990s and, finally halted in 1999. NATO infrastructure fund continues.);
- Revenues based on the special laws of the Ministry of National Defense.
### Resources Allocated to the TAF ($ Million)

(The Average Foreign Currency Exchange Rates of the Turkish Central Bank for the Related Years were Used.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>MND Budget</th>
<th>TAF DF Budget</th>
<th>DIS Fund</th>
<th>Special Allocations</th>
<th>Total (TL)</th>
<th>FMS Loans</th>
<th>NATO ENF Fund</th>
<th>State Company Loans</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3,341.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>826.8</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>4,225.7</td>
<td>328.5</td>
<td>184.3</td>
<td>186.0</td>
<td>698.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3,997.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>887.3</td>
<td>101.7</td>
<td>4,996.4</td>
<td>320.0</td>
<td>161.2</td>
<td>498.4</td>
<td>979.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>4,407.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>772.4</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>5,303.5</td>
<td>175.0</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>715.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5,327.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>1,056.9</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>6,503.3</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>650.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5,968.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>1,008.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>7,041.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>165.0</td>
<td>400.0</td>
<td>565.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7,218.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1,466.9</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>8,760.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>300.0</td>
<td>480.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II, borrowed from White Paper 2000, p. 110.

The budget of the Ministry of National Defense constitutes the most important portion of the resources allocated to defense. The MND budget is distributed to the forces and organizations as follows:

- Land Forces: 49.3%
- Air Forces: 21.9%
- Naval Forces: 14.4%
- MND (organization): 7.2%
- TGS (organization): 7.1%

According to the White Paper 2000, an average of 30 percent of the MND budget is allocated for personnel expenses, 68.9 percent for other current expenses and the balance for investment and transfer expenses (See Table II)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSONNEL EXPENSES</td>
<td>1,270,000</td>
<td>30.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CURRENT EXPENSES</td>
<td>2,850,000</td>
<td>68.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Defense Investments</td>
<td>1,523,011</td>
<td>36.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Expenses</td>
<td>1,099,046</td>
<td>26.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>227,941</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INVESTMENTS</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSFERS</td>
<td>13,450</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,136,500</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distribution of the MND 2000 Budget (Billion TL)

Table III, borrowed from White Paper 2000, p. 109.

According to the White Paper 2000, the share of the MND budget in the GNP is an average of 2.5 percent and around 9.7 percent of the consolidated budget (See Table IV).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT</th>
<th>CONSOLIDATED BUDGET</th>
<th>MND BUDGET</th>
<th>SHARE OF MND BUDGET IN GNP (%)</th>
<th>SHARE OF CONSOLIDATED BUDGET IN GNP (%)</th>
<th>SHARE OF MND BUDGET IN THE CONSOLIDATED BUDGET (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>130,519.1</td>
<td>27,742.6</td>
<td>2,607.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>171,736.6</td>
<td>29,340.5</td>
<td>3,341.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>184,037.4</td>
<td>43,846.7</td>
<td>3,997.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>190,836.4</td>
<td>41,785.0</td>
<td>4,407.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>188,060.1</td>
<td>56,683.8</td>
<td>5,327.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>186,264.2</td>
<td>64,910.9</td>
<td>5,968.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>205,273.4</td>
<td>81,719.0</td>
<td>7,218.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparison of the Budget of the Ministry of National Defense with the Gross National Product (GNP) and the Consolidated Budget (% Million)

(The Average Foreign Currency Exchange Rate of the Turkish Central bank for the Related Year Was Taken as the Basis.)

Table IV, borrowed from White Paper 2000, p. 108. In the general budget of 2001, due to the economic crisis, the share of the Ministry of National Defense was reduced to USD 5.4 billion.

Defense expenditures in Turkey present a number of measurement problems. Within the context of Turkey’s highly inflationary financial environment and ongoing
revisions introduced into the government’s budgetary accounts, the measurement of the relative as well as absolute size of the national defense expenditure (and its sources of financing) poses a number of difficult statistical issues, some of which are the following:

1. The overall national defense spending is financed by three major sources: (a) Central Government Consolidated Budget; (b) various off-budget funds, the most significant of which is the Defense Industry Support Fund; and (c) foreign official and non-official resource inflows. In particular, the resource balances of the relevant off-budget funds are not sufficiently transparent.
2. The initial and end-year budget appropriations may exhibit large differences, because of supplementary budgets introduced in the course of a given year’s budget implementation. To the extent possible, actual expenditures should be used for intertemporal assessments.
3. The real as well as nominal dollar exchange rates do not behave systematically over time. Thus, the dollar-based expenditure estimates are not always meaningful for annual comparisons.
4. In recent years, the share of interest payments in total budget expenditures has been very high, increasing from 28 percent in 1997 to 43 percent in 2001. In this context, it should be noted that the bulk of nominal interest payments accounts for the inflationary erosion of the domestic debt stock, given the very high rates of domestic inflation. Hence, it would perhaps be more meaningful to measure and evaluate the fiscal burden of defense expenditure in relation to the non-interest budget expenditure and/or tax revenue collected in the budget implementation.
5. In the context of the IMF – supported stabilization program, the coverage of the Consolidated Budget has significantly broadened from 1999 onwards, by incorporating highly fragmented off-budget funds that have traditionally operated outside the budget. This process is likely to continue in the coming years to ensure a more realistic consolidation of government accounts for improved financial management and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny. Thus, one may expect a somewhat declining share of defense in Central Government’s budget in the medium-term future, barring unexpected international events that may trigger much higher spending for national security.
6. Finally, one should note that for proper cross-country comparisons, defense expenditure should include budgetary spending by gendarmerie, coast guard as well as the Ministry of National Defense. In fact, this is taken into account in the administrative classification of data given in the official budget documents.

Tables V and VI represent an effort to get over measurement difficulties and to reach more reliable indicators.∗

Table V. Relative Size of Defense Expenditure, Turkey: 1997-2002∗

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Percent of GNP</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Percent of Total Budget Expenditure</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Percent of Total Budget Non-interest expenditure</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Percent of Total Budget Revenue</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Percent of Total Budget Tax Revenue</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Memo items (Percent of GNP)

| Additional non-budget | 0.7  | 0.8  | 0.8  | n.a  | n.a  |
| Domestic resources    | 0.5  | 0.6  | 0.6  | n.a  | n.a  |
| Foreign resources (for national defense) | 0.2  | 0.2  | 0.2  | n.a  | n.a  |

Note: ∗/ The estimates are derived from data given in the 2002 Central Government Consolidated Budget document (Bütçe Gerekçesi) submitted to Parliament by the Ministry of Finance. The source for the underlying GNP data is the 2002 Annual Program, State Planning Organization (p. 16). The estimates for additional non-budget resources are based on the White Book 2000, Ministry of National Defense (MND). Defense expenditure is the sum of budgetary spending by the MND, Gendarmerie and Coast Guard. 2002 figures are calculated from 2002 Program and Budget documents.

∗ The authors are grateful to Professor Merih Celasun for his valuable comments on measurement issues as well as for Tables V and VI.
### Table VI: GNP, Budget and Defense Expenditure, Turkey: 1999-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002(^a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gross National Product (GNP)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>187.5</td>
<td>202.1</td>
<td>155.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Government Budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-interest expenditure</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense expenditure</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o/w Min. of Nat. Defense</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Government Budget</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenue</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Memo item:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GNP Index, 1998= 100</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
\(^a\) Official program estimates.  
\(^b\) All data are converted to US dollar units at the annual average exchange rates.

Sources:  
2002 Annual Program, State Planning Organization  
2002 Central Government Consolidated Budget, Ministry of Finance

The most important deficiency regarding the democratic control of the defense budget manifests itself in the Parliament. Defense budgets are usually approved by the Grand National Assembly without any opposition or even any serious debate in the parliamentary committees. The reason for this automaticity stems more from the lack of interest of politicians than the assertiveness of the military. Turkish politicians have not, as a rule, professed great interest and inclination towards involvement in the technicalities of defense policy. They usually take office without knowledge of military strategy and weapon procurement issues. Thus, in most cases, the advise provided by the members of the TGS plays a determining role. A growth in the role of civilian politicians in defense policy and budgeting would then depend to a great extent on the improvement of their interest and knowledge in defense matters and on the creation of civilian research institutes of defense policy.
Defense Industry and Procurement

In the mid-1980s, the defense industry underwent a reform. Until then, cooperation between the private and public sectors remained at a very low level. Most of the plants were owned by the state and run either by the armed forces or by the Machinery and Chemicals Industries Institution, another state enterprise. Factories belonging to the Institution produced a range of relatively low-cost and low-technology weapons and ammunition, including machine guns, mortars, howitzers and rockets. In addition, the armed forces had naval shipyards, and maintenance and overhaul capabilities.

In 1985, the government began to take steps for the utilization of the country’s industrial base and technical skills more rationally to promote the development of defense industry. The government established the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (DIDA) whose aim was to promote cooperation between the private and public sectors and to encourage the transfer of technology and capital to Turkey. DIDA also administered a Defense Industry Support Fund, which generated financial accumulation through indirect taxes levied on luxury imports, alcohol, and cigarettes. To a considerable extent, the financing of the defense industry and joint projects was realized through this fund. This system continues to operate with a slight change. The DIDA which was reorganized in 1989 as the Undersecretariat of the Defense Industry (SSM), and subordinated to the Ministry of Defense has a separate legal personality and a separate budget of its own, which does not pass through the Parliament and is not audited by the Court of Public Accounts.

The Defense Industry Support Fund is administered by SSM. It is a highly flexible mechanism that guarantees a constant flow of financial resources, free from bureaucratic formalities. Since 1986, the Fund has had a revenue amounting to USD 11 billion. 80% of this amount was spent for domestic production purposes, 16% on direct purchases and 4% on advanced technology projects.

Turkey’s defense industry policy envisages that the defense industrial activities should be open not only to domestic firms, but also to foreign enterprises. It, however, suggests that the defense industrial cooperation with foreign countries should not be sensitive to changing political conditions. It also provides that priority should be given to the domestic defense industry for the equipment and systems that are decided to be procured. If procurement from abroad is deemed necessary, priority should then be given to proposals which allow for offset applications that will contribute to the
domestic industry. The defense industry aims to develop its international market capability and export potential. Moreover, the policy envisages that the defense industry should not limit itself to defense production but it should also acquire the capability to produce for civilian purposes.\textsuperscript{27}

Turkey spent a total of USD 27.8 billion on defense procurement over the 1988-1997 period. In other words, it annually invested approximately USD 3 billion on the acquisition of equipment and material for the armed forces. According to a current plan, it expects to invest more than USD 100 billion for the continuing modernization of its armed forces until 2030.\textsuperscript{28} On the other hand, efforts are underway for collaborative projects with American and European firms. The Turkish-German frigate program has been a good example of such bilateral cooperation. Turkey actively participates in the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) where it has been involved in collaborative projects such as the manufacture of Stinger and Maverick missiles. Some other joint ventures include those undertaken by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), such as the production of Cugar helicopters and CASA CN-235 transport aircraft. TAI will also have a 5.5\% production share in the Airbus Military Company’s A400M transport aircraft program. Upon the invitation of the United States, Turkey began to negotiate for participation in the engineering and manufacturing development stage of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program at a cost of USD 800 million. TAF plans to include the new generation JSF to its inventory, replacing its F-16 fleet by 2015.\textsuperscript{29}

The most important step taken in developing defense industry through joint ventures, however, has been the F-16 project with the United States and the creation of TAI in 1984 for that purpose. TAI has produced 278 F-16 jet fighters. 46 of those fighters have been exported to Egypt and the rest has joined the Turkish air force. In TAI, Turkish partners hold 51\% of the shares while General Dynamics and General Electric have 49\% of the shares. Thanks to this project, Turkey’s new domestic aircraft industry has made considerable progress in the 1990s. the project has allowed Turkey to acquire new technology. It has greatly contributed to the improvement of managerial capabilities that carry over to the next generation of aircraft production projects.

The defense industry policy, however, has not fully attained its objectives. It continues to suffer from serious deficiencies despite the increasing number of collaborative projects. It is particularly weak in R&D work. The chief reason for this
weakness is the high cost of such activities. The low level of cooperation between Turkish public and private sectors constitutes another important factor impeding “cross-fertilization” of the economy. The Undersecretary of Defense Industries, Prof. Ali Ercan, points to the poor state of R&D as one of the major obstacles preventing the further development of defense industries. He underlines the reluctance of the advanced countries in transferring the technology of some critical systems. Although this is not an easy problem to overcome, the Undersecretary argues, Turkey could balance this insufficiency by concentrating on areas that require very little equipment transfer such as the development of indigenous software source codes that rely on human resource capacity. An example of such a project is the development of “the mission computer” which is composed of hardware and software source codes and is the most crucial part of the attack helicopter (145 AH-IŻ King Cobra) co-production deal with the United States. When the American Administration refused to transfer the most critical parts of the mission computer the SSM concluded with the Turkish Scientific Research Board an agreement for the local production of the mission computer. The SSM expects the project will be successful because it mainly depends on human resource capacity.

Nevertheless, Turkey still depends nearly 60 % on foreign companies for its main systems requirements. In the electronics industry local contribution is about 20 % while in other projects the percentage increases to 80 %. In other words, the average local contribution to defense products is around 40 %. Beside the weakness of the R&D, other obstacles are the insufficiency of raw materials and the general state of the economy which has been hit by consecutive crises since 1990. There are also some legal restrictions that worsen the economic problem. The defense industry funds are not allowed to be converted into US dollars automatically. The revenues are kept at the Central Bank in Turkish liras whereas the spendings of the SSM are usually made in foreign currency. Consequently, the Undersecretariat of Defense Industry suffers from considerable losses because of the high inflation rate.

The defense industry has difficulty to increase its exports. Turkey exports approximately 10 % of its defense industry products while 90 % of them goes domestically to the TAF and the civilian sector. The SSM has also difficulty to get the offset agreements implemented by foreign companies. The Undersecretariat has so far signed 41 offset agreements with joint venture firms. Only five of those firms have so far fulfilled their offset pledges. The total amount of offset pledges is USD 3.4 billion.
Only USD 1.64 of that amount have been realized. Nevertheless, offset agreements have paved the way for many Turkish firms to open up to international markets and promoted their business connections with foreign companies. Taking into consideration the benefits of offset agreements, the SSM has recently adopted new offset regulations providing the parties to the agreement with more flexibility.

From time to time, some of the NATO allies have imposed restrictions to their exports to Turkey on the grounds of human rights violations. For that reason, Turkey has made efforts to diversify its suppliers. An example of this policy of diversification is Ankara’s signing an agreement with Korea for the procurement of self-propelled Howitzer components. The rapidly increasing trade with Russia can in the future include a significant element of defense procurement. Cooperation with Israel has also provided Turkey with a new and valuable source of weapons procurement. Restrictions, however, have never been a formidable obstacle to sustainability of the modernization efforts. Despite the efforts to diversify resources; the United States, Germany, and France have remained Turkey’s major suppliers.

**Executive Summary: Lessons Learned**

The defense reform has been successful to a great extent due to the absence of civilian opposition to the demands of the military and the sustained political consensus about the threats the country has had to counter. The civilian governments have also a share in the reform not only because of their passive acquiescence, but also because they had the vision of planning and initiating certain radical reforms. The liberalization of the economy in the 1980s by the Özal government made a very positive impact on the defense industry. It encouraged the public sector to cooperate with private firms. The technological, financial and managerial resources of the private sector, combined with foreign partnership, facilitated the development of the defense industry. The Defense Industry Undersecretariat and The Defense Industry Support Fund were established through the initiative of the same government. What is probably more important is that, as a result of these changes, the growing role of the civilian government in exploring joint venture possibilities has rendered the military establishment increasingly dependent on civilian politicians and managers. By the same token, the internationalization of the economy, and the increasing role of private foreign business in the defense industry have moderated the military’s State-centric conception of internal and international politics.
Turkey’s somewhat peculiar geostrategic conditions its excessively unstable regional environment and its internal conflicts differ radically from those of the central eastern European countries, with the possible exception of southeastern Europe. While some of Turkey’s experiences may be relevant, others do not seem to be applicable to the new members of NATO and the candidate states whose threat perceptions are far less pressing and whose primary foreign and security policy objective is to join NATO and the EU. Turkey’s military reform policy has been influenced by two conflicting trends that characterize the present international system. While its NATO membership, EU candidacy and its participation in peace operations are inspiring internationalization, multilateralism, cooperative security and democratic control of the armed forces, its regional environment is suggesting security through power politics. Therefore, Turkey’s reform policy has pursued two broad objectives: (1) to improve deterrence capacity against threats emanating from the region by developing a forward defense capability; and (2) to prepare TAF for the new missions of NATO, EU and other international organizations, namely peace-support, peacekeeping, peacemaking and crisis-management tasks.

The two contradictory currents in the contemporary international system have had somewhat a positive impact on TAF which was able to pursue a sustained reform and modernization policy. The process has been carried out in the form of modernization, further professionalization of the officer and NCO cadres, and a very slow reduction in the land forces conscription system; and in the form of modernization only in the naval and air forces that are already highly professionalized by their nature. The reform and modernization process has not required a thorough overhaul of the defense organization. Nevertheless, creation of a number of new institutions within the existing organization has become necessary for a sustainable, effective and flexible implementation of the reform policy. One prominent example of such institutions is the SSM. Other examples are the Peacekeeping Departments that have been established in the TGS and in each of the three forces.

Preparation for peace operations requires establishment of contacts with international organizations, NGOs and developing skills to operate in multinational formations. This implies a certain denationalization of the defense policy and introduce a more pluralistic approach to defense planning. Transparency of military activities, especially concerning budgeting and spending, cannot be improved without parliamentary oversight and non-governmental examination by the media, academia,
and research centers. The parliament and political parties can hardly offer critical views and alternative strategies in an esoteric field such as defense planning if they are not intellectually equipped. The same is equally valid for the media and the universities. The political parties, therefore, if they wish to contribute to the security and defense policy and increase transparency and civilian control over the military, should create research institutes and/or encourage existing civilian institutions by funding them to carry out research projects on defense policy. It is also important to include strategic studies programs in the university curricula especially at the graduate level. This would create a human resource of defense experts who might offer their services to political parties, parliamentary committees, the media, and research centers. Such a development, however, would require civilian funding. It cannot be initiated unless the civilian sector seriously believes in the necessity of the civilian control of the military.

A long-term modernization program should be considered simultaneously with the development of defense industry. It is impossible, however, to consider the defense industry of a country independently from the general state of the economy of that country. An unstable economy would constitute the major obstacle for R&D and the growth of defense industry, even if the country in question has adequate human resources. Another retarding factor is undoubtedly the lack of cooperation between private and public sectors.

No country would transfer state-of-the-art technologies that have cost billions of dollars. A country would transfer a technology to another country relatively easily when it has developed a new system to replace the old one. This problem could be to some extent eased in two ways. First, R&D should be oriented to systems that does not require raw material or equipment but human resource capacity, provided that the country has that capacity. Secondly, joint ventures with technologically advanced countries would facilitate the transfer of know-how in factory management and production of the technologically sophisticated weapon systems.

Financial problems may be overcome to some extent through cooperative projects and offset agreements that promote exports. It may also be useful to create a defense industry fund separate from the general budget of the government. Such a solution would provide the government with an additional resource and flexibility. On the other hand, however, it would decrease transparency and avoid parliamentary oversight.


4 Temel Ersoy, “Changing Role and Structure of the Turkish Navy after the end of the Cold War” (unpublished paper, 2001); and Naval Forces (special issue, 2001).


6 Ibid., p. 80.

7 Ibid., p. 80-81.

8 Ibid., p. 81-82.


10 Turkey did not experience harsh debates in the Grand National Assembly during the process of ratification of the BTWC in November 1974, the NPT in April 1980, the CWC in May 1997, or the CTBT in November 1999.


14 Ibid.


24 A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, p. 216.


31 Ibid., p. 94.

32 Ibid., p. 94.