

TURKEY

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1. Introduction

A study on *Turkey and nuclear disarmament* should primarily revolve around the status of Turkey within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as Turkey’s bilateral relations with the United States in the military sphere. An equal emphasis should also be assigned to Turkey’s highly strategic geopolitical landscape, which sometimes offered opportunities, or on the contrary, generated disincentives for Turkish political and security elites¹ to adopt policies congruent to global and/or regional nuclear disarmament efforts. Deployment of nuclear weapons in Turkey was a consequence of both its admittance to the NATO alliance, and the geostrategic imperatives of its immediate neighborhood. Policies adopted by Turkish political and security elites harmonious with global nuclear disarmament efforts have essentially been an outgrowth of the fundamental principles and objectives of Turkish foreign and security policy, in so far as they were not constrained by regional security considerations. More often than not, however, Turkish political and security elites have faced dilemmas arising from the incongruity of their regional versus global security concerns.

In their formal statements, Turkish political and security elites consider nuclear disarmament as “an absolutely necessary but in the same time a long process during which steps must be taken very carefully by the international community.”² As this rather oblique statement may suggest, Turkey did not pursue an immutable policy with regard to nuclear disarmament. For that reason, Turkey should neither be categorized as a strictly

¹ Although the phrase *political and security elites* is thought to be self-explanatory, it may still worth noting that, in the particular case of Turkey, throughout the chapter *security elites* will denote those civilian or military officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the Military, as well as others, not necessarily officials, who are known to exhibit scholarly interest in the field of security.

² E-mail correspondance with experts in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1996.

anti- or, on the contrary, an absolutely pro-nuclear weapons country. Turkey's attitude shifted from one side to the other depending on the circumstances, and based on the threat assessments of the security elites in specific periods as such issues have come to the fore. Deviations in Turkish attitude in this particular subject matter can best be observed in its variant strategies adopted vis-a-vis the proposals that aimed at establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZ) in the immediate surroundings of Turkey.³ In the same vein, a proposal for a forthwith and complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of all of the non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) is not desirable for Turkey, unless these weapons systems are substituted with other powerful instruments that would provide comparable security assurances. In view of the fact that uncertainty still reigns in world politics, and the military buildups in unconventional weapon systems of so called "rogue states" in especially the Middle East are in progress, Turkey considers nuclear deterrence worth keeping, at least still for a while.⁴

With these in mind, the primary objective of this chapter will be to reflect Turkey's attitude towards the nuclear related matters like: a ban on nuclear tests; a cut-off in the production of fissile material; establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones in various parts of the globe; and the post-Cold War strategies of NATO and of the Western European Union. It should not be considered however as fully representing the ultimate official stance of Turkish political and security elites. Such a task is beyond the confines of this study, not to mention the limits of scholarly access to the ultimate decision making mechanism in Turkey. An underlying goal of the chapter will be to let the reader view the issues from a wider angle. Hence, it will be an attempt to touch the untouched from a scholarly perspective. The implications of the challenging nature of some of the recent developments in the issue areas that are to be raised here will be discussed with specific references to the national security considerations of Turkish political and security elites. Accordingly, a special attention will be paid to discussing at length the difficulties of formulating appropriate strategies for Turkey emanating from the extremely complex geopolitics of the country. This being the case, an emphasis will be added to highlighting

³ As will be discussed later at length, Turkey opposed the idea of a NWFZ in the Balkans while endorsed a similar arrangement for the Middle East. More recently, Turkish security elites implied that a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe is not desirable for Turkey, while such a zone in Central Asia, if established, is.

⁴ In 1991, NATO decided to reduce its land based nuclear stockpile in Europe by 80 percent, and this reduction was completed by 1993. See, "Focus on NATO: Facts on NATO's Nuclear Posture," *NATO Review*, July 1996, No: 4, p. 19. Nuclear weapons are still deployed, as of February 1997, in four non-nuclear-weapons state members of NATO, namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. Conversations with Tariq RAUF from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, January 1997.

the controversies between the general thrust of Turkey's foreign and security policy, and the policies adopted in some specific instances.

2. The Security Situation After the End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War had a powerful impact on the security of Turkey in many respects. Throughout the Cold War years, Turkey had enjoyed the somewhat privileged status of being one of NATO's sixteen nations since 1952. With its geostrategic location as a flank country and the second largest standing army in the Alliance after the United States, Turkey had become an indispensable ingredient to the security of the Western world. Hence, not much room was left for the Turkish political elites to worry about national security. These rather serious matters were indeed left to the military which was primarily concerned with the preservation of the unity and sovereignty of the Turkish Republic. Cognizant of Turkey's unique geostrategic outlook, Turkish security elites believed that they could count to a considerable extent on the United States in the first place, and on NATO in general, so far as the Soviet threat was concerned.

However, the flip side of the coin should also be mentioned at this stage. When Turkey joined NATO, the parties tacitly agreed that Turkey would help contain the Soviet Union. Should deterrence have failed, Turkey would have made its facilities available to NATO and would have distracted as many Soviet forces as possible from a campaign in Central Europe.⁵ In other words, Turkey risked its own devastation and invasion as a NATO ally by sitting in the immediate neighborhood of the Soviet Union simply because the military thinking of the Alliance focused on the central front as the main area of Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, putting an overwhelming emphasis on the contingency of a massive attack through Germany into Western Europe. NATO's strategic calculations developed around this priority, and Turkey's contribution was considered in function of such a contingency.⁶ Nevertheless, thinking in terms of the paradoxical logic of strategy, the bigger the Soviet threat was perceived, the higher the contribution of the West would be expected by the Turkish political and security elites. Their overwhelming belief was that in return to the risks taken as a frontline state, Turkey would fall under the NATO's deterrent and defense umbrella, and the Alliance would provide economic and military assistance to modernize the Turkish armed forces. In a nutshell, during the Cold War, the international politics was

⁵ Bruce R. KUNIHOLM, "Turkey and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, 1991, Vol: 70, No: 2, p. 41.

⁶ A detailed account on that matter exists in, Ali L. KARAOSMANOGLU, "Europe's Geopolitical Parameters," paper presented in an international conference at Bilkent University, Ankara, March 1996, p. 12.

generally seen as 'business as usual' from Turkey's standpoint as its military capabilities and political constraints were taken into consideration.

The end of the Cold War, however, which literally meant the disappearance of the threat perceived from the Soviet Union in the first place, caused drastic changes in the security environment of Turkey. Not all of these changes were unfavorable. In particular, the new map of the geographical surroundings of Turkey is self-explanatory as new independent states emerged from the territory of the Soviet Union. The most striking outcome of this development is that, for the first time in the four-century-old history of Turco-Russian relations, the two nations have been geographically torn apart.⁷ Dissolution of common borders with the Russian-led "Soviet empire" contributed greatly to the security of Turkey. Because, the minimum time required for its colossal neighbor to launch a surprise attack is increased to one year from a figure that used to be expressed in weeks, if not days.⁸ Conventional force reduction levels that were achieved with the CFE Treaty had improved the disproportionate situation between the two actors in that area, but not to a high extent though. It must be added that, the change in the Russian military doctrine in October 1993 commensurate with the requirements of the so called "near abroad" doctrine, and hence the respective demand of Russia to revise the terms of the CFE with reference to its rules applying to the Caucasus raised serious concerns in the security elites in Turkey.⁹

The emergence of new independent states in the former Soviet territory as well as the former Yugoslavia carried with it as many new hopes and opportunities as worries and dilemmas of coexistence in regions where nations had lived together for decades. The most practical end result of this evolution was that the number of geographical neighbors of Turkey doubled overnight, among those existed nations with which it had deep historical and cultural ties. Compounded with the excitement of being regarded by the Western community as the role-model for the newly emerged republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus¹⁰ its historical and cultural ties compelled Turkey to propagate solutions

⁷ If one excludes the far-located neighborhood in the Black Sea basin and the common borders with the so-called Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

⁸ Interviews with Turkish military experts.

⁹ For an excellent discussion on the importance of the CFE Treaty in European security as well as an assessment of the threat to the Western interests arising from the Russian demand for revision of the CFE rules applying to the flank zone see, Richard A. FALKENRATH, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings," *International Security*, 1995, Vol: 19, No: 4, pp: 118 - 144.

¹⁰ The so called Newly Independent States (NIS) in the Caucasus and Central Asia, with few exceptions, share many things in common with both Turkey and Iran -to varying degrees though- as far as the history, culture, religion and linguistics are concerned. Hence, the possibility of

to the problems of the 'turkic world.' Since, clashes between the turkic and the non-turkic identities in that region gained magnitude as the Soviet authority on them evaporated. Specifically, the hot conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan emanating from the dispute over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh region has become a test case for Turkey with regard to its capabilities and abilities to properly 'lead' the newly independent states of turkic identity. The most Turkey could achieve in that regard, however, was to be a part of the Minsk Group established under the auspices of then Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).¹¹ The dispute remains largely unresolved in spite of the efforts of Turkey in the international arena. Similarly, as war erupted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially when the Serbian atrocities were intensified toward the Bosnians, Turkey found itself in a still more difficult situation. The Muslim identity of the Turkish citizens, let alone the pressure put by approximately two millions of them being of Bosnian descent, compelled Turks to help their Muslim brothers living in the troubled lands of the *Rumelia*.¹² These communities of different ethnic roots used to live in peace and harmony for centuries under Ottoman rule. However, the efforts and the contributions of Turkey, be it economical or military, fell short of finding a solution or saving lives of hundreds of thousands of Bosnians.

The extreme discontent of Turks in the public domain with the performance of the Turkish governments and the military, caused deep distrust of the administration and eventually weakened the central authority as demonstrations were frequently staged in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara. The alleged failure of foreign policy of Turkey at all fronts

establishment of comprehensive relations between these states and Iran in particular, inflicted fears in the Western capitals. The fundamentalist regime of Iran and its generally hostile attitude towards the West were the main sources of serious concerns. One major objective of the Western countries then was to virtually contain the expansionist ambitions of Iran by not leaving the floor to export its fundamentalist regime towards the NIS. Therefore, Turkey, with its secular democracy and its market economy was considered in the Western capitals to be a feasible alternative to Iran. Turkey, was equally thought to be well enough equipped to act as a role model for the NIS, and help them survive the painful and dangerous period of transition after the collapse of the decades-old Soviet authority.

¹¹ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech and Slovak Republics, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and the United States participated in the CSCE (now OSCE) negotiations that took place within the framework of the Minsk Group. The function of the Group was to define the emergency measures required to ensure cessation of hostilities. Later, the Minsk Group served to monitor the cease-fire imposed by the UN Security Council resolution 882, of which Turkey was a co-sponsor together with Russia and the United States. For a larger discussion on that matter see, Mustafa KIBAROGLU, "Impact of the Northern Tier on the Middle East: A Rejoinder," *Security Dialogue*, September 1996, Vol: 27, No: 3, pp: 319-324.

¹² Rumelia is mostly considered to denote the Ottoman territory in the western Thrace and the portion of the Balkans inhabited by mostly the Turks and other Muslim communities such as the Bosnians, Albanians, and Kosovans.

had serious repercussions on domestic politics that gained further momentum with the increasing insurgencies of the PKK terrorist organization that had launched a campaign against the central political authority. The 14-year-old low-intensity war that has been taking place mostly in the southeastern part of Turkey bordering the Middle East, has so far claimed the lives of thousands of people, both military personnel and civilians. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and developments in its aftermath in the early 1990s eliminated the authority of the latter in its northern territory. Such an occurrence has further complicated the security considerations of Turkey. The region then became a sanctuary for PKK terrorists that enabled them to flourish and wage more frequent attacks on targets inside Turkey.

Being at the pivotal point of a geographical location encircled by the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans, and hence being exposed to the side effects of intra- and inter-state conflicts in these regions, Turkey's unity and state sovereignty started to be questioned and even threatened internally. Such an internal threat unavoidably attracted the most attention of the Turkish political and security elites, and largely undermined their concern in many of the global issues. The task of considering international problems such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or NATO expansion was thus confined to a handful of security elites from the government and academia.¹³

3. Public Opinion About the Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Disarmament

There has not been a serious discussion, let alone a public debate, in Turkey about nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament.¹⁴ One of the primary reasons for this was the ultimate

¹³ For broad deliberations on these matters see, for instance, Nezihi ÇAKAR, "Turkey's Security Challenges," *Perceptions*, June-August 1996, Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), Ankara, Vol: 1, No: 2, pp: 12-21; and Olgan BEKAR, "NATO's Enlargement: Russia and Turkey," *Eurasian Studies*, Spring 1996, Yeni Forum Corporation, Ankara, Vol: 3, No: 1, pp: 65-80. The author of the former article is a retired general from the Turkish Army, while the author of the latter works for the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. And, as an elaborate and alternative perspective from academia see, Duygu B. SEZER, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation," *Comparative Strategy*, London, 1995, Vol: 14, No: 2, pp: 149 - 173.

¹⁴ During the short-lived and limited public interest in the deployment of the US Jupiter missiles, the Cuban missiles crisis of October 1962, and the developments that followed suit, nuclear issues were only sporadically and superficially debated in the public domain by virtue of their domestic political repercussions without touching the substance. It is interesting to note that the word 'nuclear' or any of its surrogates were not even spelled out while debating the issue. Words like 'rockets' and 'bases' were enough to denote the whole subject matter. This unique period warrants a thesis-like paper, and luckily there exists one such a study that is ready for publishing. For an excellent account on the period covering the introduction of nuclear forces to Turkey, the Cuban missile crisis, and its aftermath see, Nur Bilge CRISS, "Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair (1959-1963)," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 1997 (forthcoming).

authority of the military in matters relating to national security. The military has done its best to prohibit the slightest leakage of relevant information to the public. Hence, partly because of the mute stance of the political and security elites, and partly because of the lack of public interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, governments in Turkey did not experience any difficulty in adopting policies regarding nuclear weapons deployment in its territory. When compared to some other NATO countries such as Norway that preferred to remain nuclear-weapon-free, or Germany, where serious contentions took place over the deployment of nuclear weapons, it would be fair to say that Turkey enjoyed silence. Even the disclosure of the clandestine nuclear weapons program of Iraq was not enough to prompt a substantial public debate.

However, this absolutely ought not to be the case for a country like Turkey which sits in the immediate proximity of the Middle East, the most volatile region in the world, notoriously acknowledged fertile soil for aspiring states that are likely to develop all sorts of weapons of mass destruction. Turkey's most strategic power stations, dams, communication and transportation lines, and above all, an important proportion of its population are already exposed to the threat of ballistic missiles that exist in the arsenals of potentially hostile states in the Middle East. Hence, there exists every reason for Turks to wonder and to discuss publicly whether their neighbors are attempting to develop mass destruction weapons, their delivery means already having been acquired.¹⁵ Turkish political and security elites should also seriously consider the possibility of acquisition of fissile or radioactive materials by terrorist groups that are abundant in the Middle East. As control over the stockpile of tons of fissile and radioactive materials in the territory of the former Soviet Union is weakened to an unprecedented extent, the likelihood of seizure of such material or even a nuclear explosive device *per se* by the terrorist groups may have unanticipated consequences for the security of Turkey. Nevertheless, these issues are barely raised or discussed even in the various publications of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the internet web pages,¹⁶ or in the article written by the current Foreign Minister (also the Deputy Prime Minister of the coalition government) published by the Center for Strategic Studies newly established in Ankara under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁷ Turkey may soon have to suffer the consequences of

¹⁵ Ironically, during the war in the Gulf in the early 1990s, the only discussion on this hot topic was whether Scud missiles in the arsenal of Iraq were sophisticated enough to hit their intended targets. In another saying, Turks hoped for lack of precision of the ballistic weapons systems at the disposal of their potential enemies rather than to discuss in the public domain and/or suggest counter-measures.

¹⁶ The web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the internet is <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

¹⁷ Tansu CILLER, "Turkish Foreign Policy in Its Dynamic Tradition", *Perceptions*, Center for Strategic Studies (SAM), Ankara, September-November 1996, Vol: 1, No: 3, pp: 5 - 16. Such

neglecting these issues. Mindful of the fact that its Middle Eastern neighbors have a bad record in the field non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, limited scholarly interest in these issues in Turkey are far from inflicting a substantial debate commensurate with the dimension of the threat associated with them¹⁸

4. The Role of Nuclear Weapons in National Security Policy & Attitude towards NWFZ

In retrospect, during the Cold War years, Turkey relied heavily, *inter alia*, on the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory for national security. Turkish political and security elites considered these weapons systems as a credible (albeit limited) deterrent against the Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) in general and the huge military might of the nearby USSR in particular. Nuclear weapons were deployed according to the mutual commitments of Turkey and NATO. To put it straight, however, the initiation of nuclear weapons to Turkey under the auspices of its NATO membership owes more to the geostrategic significance of the country for the United States in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Because, as was the case for Norway, the North Atlantic Treaty did not bring a compelling undertaking to the member states with reference to the deployment of nuclear weapons or any other specific weapons systems. There were, however, good reasons for Turkey to rely on a nuclear deterrent. Soviet claims on the Turkish Straits²⁰ and on some of the eastern provinces of Turkey during the Stalin reign inflicted grave security concerns in the Turkish political and security elites. Turkey's vulnerable situation

concerns of Turkey are only slightly mentioned, during the premiership of Tansu Ciller, in a NATO publication which is however rarely accessible in the public domain. See, Tansu CILLER, "Turkey and NATO: Stability in the Vortex of Change," *NATO Review*, April 1994, No: 2, pp: 3-6

¹⁸ For an extensive coverage of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and an assessment of the threat posed to Turkey, see Sitki EGELI, *Balistik Fuzeler ve Turkiye* ('Ballistic Missiles and Turkey'), Ankara, Under-Secretariat of Defense Industries, Turkish Ministry of Defense, (Sales no: SSM-10 Strateji-1), 1993; For an account on Iran's nuclear policy and the implications of the recent Bushehr nuclear reactor deal between Iran and Russia see, Mustafa KIBAROGLU, "Is Iran Going Nuclear?," *Foreign Policy*, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, Winter 1996, Vol: XX, Nos: 3 - 4, pp: 35 - 55.

¹⁹ At the NATO meeting in Washington, D.C., in December 1957, it was decided to deploy long-range ballistic missiles in Europe. Around 1960, US Thor and Jupiter missiles became operational in the UK, Italy and Turkey. They had a range of approximately 3,000 km and a warhead yield of 1.5 megatons. Jupiters in Italy (30) and in Turkey (15) were phased out by 1965. See, *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1982*, Taylor & Francis Ltd, London, for Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 1982, p. 7.

²⁰ The straits of Istanbul (Bosphorus) and Canakkale (the Dardannels) in the northwestern Turkey are highly strategic sea routes for the countries littoral to the Black Sea. The status of the straits are agreed upon in the Treaty of Montreux of 1936.

in the aftermath of the Great War and the timely pledge of the United States to extend its security umbrella towards Turkey marked the beginning of substantial US-Turkey bilateral military cooperation.²¹ During the 1960s and 70s, the Soviet threat felt more explicitly both in Turkey and in the United States as the Soviet Union closed the gap with the US in the nuclear field. The Soviets have also increased their military presence and capabilities both in conventional and unconventional weaponry across the eastern frontier of Turkey, as well as their naval presence in the Mediterranean. That period also witnessed intensifying relations between the Soviets and the Syrians at all respects including the military field. Growing military presence of the Soviet Union both in quantitative and qualitative terms across the southern flank of NATO instigated the Alliance in general and Turkey in particular to rely extensively (though gradually) on nuclear forces.

During the Cold War, fully aware of the overwhelming preeminence of the Warsaw Pact countries in the conventional weapons systems, Turkey opposed the proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Balkans.²² Non-deployment or removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of Turkey was believed to expose it to a very difficult situation militarily. For Turkey, the existence of nuclear weapons on its soil meant the active presence and full backing of NATO in general and the United States in particular in contingency plans

²¹ It may also worth noting that the Turkish-American military relations suffered from periods of distrust in two instances. Both drew on the Turkey's strategy towards and hence interventions in Cyprus. First, the US President Johnson sent a bitter letter to the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu in June 1964 when Turkey dispatched military aircrafts to Cyprus to show flag to the Greek-dominated Cypriot administration with a view to induce the Greek Cypriots to treat the Turkish Cypriots fairly and equally. With the so called "Johnson's letter" the US administration warned its Turkish counterpart that Turkey could not be permitted to use any of the US-origin military equipment in its intervention in Cyprus. What's worse was the threat that came from the US stating that NATO might not defend Turkey should the Soviets launch an attack emanating from an aggression provoked by a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. The second period of bittered relations came when the US Senate imposed a military embargo on Turkey in July 1975 in the aftermath of the military intervention of Turkey in Cyprus in July 1974 that followed a Greek-sponsored military coup that aimed annexation of the island to Greece. The military embargo lasted until September 1978 but had some unrecoverable effects in the mindset of the Turkish political and security elites. A clear indication of this was Turkey's attempts to diversify its military cooperation and procurement strategies by including other countries such as Germany, and France to its suppliers list, as well as to develop an indigenous military industry to become as self-reliant as possible.

²² A proposal for a nuclear-weapons free Balkans was first avowed by the Soviet Union on June 25, 1959. As the deployment of US medium range nuclear missiles to Turkey was seen on the horizon, Soviets initiated counter measures at the international level, and 'recommended' to the Turks not to accept these weapons that could hit targets in the Soviet Union, and therefore would be the target of Soviet nuclear missiles. However, Turkish attitude was not not receptive to the Soviet threat. The proposal was reiterated by the Balkan members of the WPO in the early 1980s

involving the WPO countries. Hence, Turkish security elites did not opt for a nuclear-weapons-free Balkans while such an occurrence could be politically desirable for some of the countries in the region and politicians for the sake of conducting “high politics” with their rethorics of disarmament.²³ Notwithstanding its opposition to a Balkan NWFZ, Turkey, on the other hand, fully supported the proposal that aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZ/ME), originally co-sponsored by Egypt and Iran as early as 1974. Besides, Turkey also expressed its concern that such a zone should encompass all sorts of weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery means. One principal reason for supporting the idea of a NWFZ/ME was the threat perceived from the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological (NCB) weapons of mass destruction into the Middle East. Such a threat however was not in the primary concern of NATO and its commitments to Turkey.²⁴ The Middle East was generally considered by most of the NATO countries to be “out of area.” Therefore, it was not clear to the Turkish political and security elites whether or not the “nuclear umbrella” of NATO would be effective in defending Turkey in case a conventional or unconventional attack launched by any (or a combination) of its Middle Eastern neighbors. Being confident enough that Turkish conventional arsenal could fairly cope with its Middle Eastern neighbors, if not superior to them, any proposal that would eliminate the unconventional capabilities of these state would be desirable for Turkey's security. Thus, Turkey assumed a supportive role for a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

At this stage, it may worth elaborating further on the concept of “out of area” and the respective Turkish attitude which may serve as an indicator of the chronic dilemma inherent in Turkey’s foreign and security policy. Whereas, the United States suggested the inclusion of an “out of area” intervention in contingency plans encompassing the Persian Gulf region, Western European members of NATO generally opposed the idea, as the threat perceived from the Eastern Europe was of primary importance for them.²⁵ So did Turkey. Because, Turkish political and security elites did not want to get into a bilateral commitment with the United States alone in contingencies including the Middle East, where the Western Europeans would probably not be present in the scene. The possibility of such an undertaking was not desirable politically or militarily for Turks due to some

²³ For instance, Greece, despite the fact that it was a NATO ally, had not only welcomed the idea of a Balkan NWFZ, but had also become a co-sponsor of subsequent deliberations.

²⁴ See, Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

²⁵ The debate between the European members of NATO and the United States is not new and can be traced back to the original drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty. For a comprehensive discussion on that matter see, Douglas T. STUART and William TOW, *The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-of-Area Problems Since 1949*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990.

reasons. To cite a few, Turkish security elites believed that the United States did not have a clearly defined strategy with regard to the contingencies in the Middle East, especially those short of a Soviet involvement. Hence, elites feared that Turkish military would have to be involved in US operations specifically designed to back Israel against Arab states. Even though Turkey kept its diplomatic correspondance with Israel at very low levels *de facto* and *de jure*²⁶ and at the same time tried to keep clear from intra-Arab disputes, Turkish political elites did not want to be seen as taking side in any Arab-Israeli dispute. Second, the memories of unsuccessful and ill-fated deliberations to institutionalize cooperation among the states in the northern tier of the Middle East (e.g., the Baghdad Pact and RCD) reminded Turks of the significance of their institutional ties with Europe and the need for strengthening them.²⁷ Hence, based on the lessons learned, Turkish political and security elites desired to stay away from the highly intricate intra-regional politics of the Middle East. In sum, due to its national and regional security concerns, and due to its foreign policy principles and objectives, Turkish political and security elites preferred to keep their political and military freedom to be able to decide independently on whether or not to partake in contingencies in the Middle East, taking into consideration the attitude of the Western European members of NATO as well.

As for the recent proposal for establishing a NWFZ in the Central and Eastern Europe, the Turkish attitude is again an opposing one. Although the proposal is informally discussed in the Western political and scholarly circles, apparently the Turkish security elites prefer to stand aloof from supporting such an happening. The reasons and the likely

²⁶ Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Israel in March 1949. Nonetheless, Turkish politicians have expressed their regrets as regards Israel's invasion and occupation of Arab lands. Turkey also repeatedly urged Israel to return to its frontiers prior to 1967 war and to comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Eventually, Turkey decided to repeal all of its high level diplomatic staff from the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv in December 1980 (right after the military coup staged in Turkey) and asked from Israel to take a similar action with regard to its Embassy staff in Ankara. Eventually, withstanding the growing pace of recent Arab-Israeli rapprochement, the Turkish-Israeli relations gained a new momentum. As an expression of this, a senior Turkish diplomat again assumed his office in the Embassy in Tel Aviv right after the Peace Accord between Israel and the PLO signed in Washington, D.C., in September 1995. The framework of multifaceted relations between Turkey and Israel will be mentioned later in this chapter.

²⁷ Following its reception to NATO, Turkey was trying to pursue an active policy in the Middle East as a regional actor which promoted Western (namely US and British) policies. Hence, the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, or the so called Baghdad Pact, signed at Baghdad on 24 February, 1955, was an outcome of this policy. See CRISS, “..The Jupiter Affair..” *ibid.* The RCD, on the other hand, denotes the agreement of Regional Cooperation for Development. RCD was another ring in the chain of US efforts to contain the Soviets through strengthening cooperation among the neighboring countries, e.g., Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. RCD remained in existence from 1964 to 1979.

implications of this attitude will be discussed later. However, suffices it to say that the assessment by the Turkish elites of the political and military repercussions of a would be NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe vis-a-vis Turkey's national security interests is not a promising one.

4.1. Threat Posed to Turkey by Unconventional Weapons in the Middle East

Turkey is within the range of all sorts of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that are strongly believed to exist in the Middle East. To be straight, however, only five states in the world are formally recognized to have a nuclear weapons arsenal namely the United States, Russia, UK, France and P. R. China, and only three states have formally admitted having a chemical weapons arsenal namely the United States, Russia and Iraq. Moreover, Iraq has also admitted to have weaponized biological agents for military purposes. Iraq's formal acknowledgement of the existence of chemical and biological weapons is due to the merits of the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) which disclosed, destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless its WMD program as mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 687 following the defeat of that country in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Regardless of what UNSCOM unearthed so far, however, Iraq is highly suspected to hide militarily significant number of operational chemical (and possibly biological) weapons, and to go ahead with its clandestine efforts to revitalize its devastated infrastructure for manufacturing mass destruction weapons anew.²⁸ Whether or not formally admitted, there are strong evidences that a combination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery vehicles do exist in a good deal of countries in the Middle East posing a serious threat to Turkey. In that regard, especially six Middle Eastern states worth considering in the first place in regard to their WMD arsenals. The risk of further spread of mass destruction weapons should not however be confined solely to these states. The six states that potentially constitute a threat to Turkey are: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Israel. Whereas the first four can be thought to pose a more serious threat, the latter two should rather be treated as less serious threats by virtue of their apparently unproblematic and even friendly relations with Turkey. For instance, Egypt being a NNWS party to the NPT, may pose a much less serious threat thanks to two main reasons: First, the final status of chemical weapons arsenal of Egypt is indeed

²⁸ There are convincing evidences that Iraq has reestablished its procurement network, and despite the UN embargo, succeeded to sell significant amounts of oil, since the close of the Gulf War, by land and sea through three main routes. Conversations with an UNSCOM inspector who participated in more than a dozen inspection missions in Iraq, February 1997.

unclear.²⁹ Secondly, regarding the improving pace of relations with Turkey, one would hardly argue that Egypt would have the intention, let alone the necessary technical capabilities, to wage a chemical weapons offensive to Turkey across the Mediterranean. By the same token, Israel is also thought to be a less serious threat, though it is believed to have a considerable nuclear weapons stockpile. There are reasons why Israel is not considered to be a real threat by the Turkish political and security elites. Relations between the two countries are substantially improving especially since the restoration of diplomatic relations on both sides that followed Israel's peace initiatives with the PLO and Jordan in late 1995 and onwards. Furthermore, the Turkish-Israeli relations have entered a new phase with the recent military cooperation agreement. The text of the agreement does apparently include clauses for improving bilateral military cooperation between Turkey and Israel similar to any such agreements. For instance, the Israeli military aircrafts will be allowed to overfly the Turkish territory for training. And, Israel, on the other hand, will upgrade 54 Turkish F-4 class military aircrafts and will provide the Turkish Airforce with electronic warfare equipment. However, the significance of the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel goes beyond these usual transactions. Putting aside the meaning of the agreement for Israel, the perception of the rapprochement between Turkey and Israel in the Middle East is of utmost importance for Turkish political and security elites. To illustrate, for instance, Turkey has serious problems with some of its neighbors, especially with Syria.³⁰ The recent military cooperation agreement between Greece and Syria exacerbated tension in the region and the threat perception of Turks. The agreement allows, among other things, the Greek military aircrafts to be stationed in the Syrian bases, as both parties "deem" necessary. On the other hand, Greece had got into similar engagements with Armenia and also attempted to do so with Georgia, the latter two being the newly independent former Soviet republics neighboring Turkey's eastern and northeastern frontier. Such moves of Greece including its initiatives to develop and diversify its relations with Iran also in the military sphere aroused a sense of encirclement

²⁹ Moreover, Egypt is also the forerunner of the proposal to render the previous NWFZ/ME proposal into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. The proposal is also known as the "Mobarek Zone." For a comprehensive study on the feasibility of such a zone and policy recommendations see, Jan PRAWITZ & James F. LEONARD (eds.), *A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, UNIDIR Research Report, New York & Geneva, May 1996.

³⁰ Principal sources of conflict between Syria and Turkey are the followings: Syria has claims on the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers originating from Turkey; There exist hard evidences that Syria gives support to the terrorist organization PKK which is engaged in insurgencies inside Turkey against both military and civilians causing heavy casualties; Moreover, Syria never recognized the status of city of Hatay (Alexandretta) which was annexed to Turkey in 1939 as the result of a local referendum. In the official maps of Syria, Hatay is still depicted as 'belonging' to that country.

in the mind of Turkish political and security elites.³¹ Furthermore, the threat posed especially by the fundamentalist aspirations of Iran and its alleged efforts to thwart the democratic regime in Turkey by proxy, exalted the value of Israel in the eyes of Turks. Such a state of affairs in the region and the state of mind of the Turkish political and security elites were highly conducive to get into substantial relations with Israel that would end up with bringing into being an axis with Israel crosscutting the one set up by the enemies and rivals of both countries.³²

Considering again the serious threat of WMD, besides Iraq, Syria and Libya are also believed to have elaborate WMD development programs especially in the chemical and biological fields. There are indications that these two countries have already established large procurement networks for this purpose. These networks comprise not only the procurement of technological parts, and chemical or biological agents, but also the recruitment of scientists and experts in these fields drained from “supplier” states like Russia and South Africa.³³ On the other hand, Iran is highly suspected to have nuclear aspirations. Although Iran adamantly opposes the allegations of having a clandestine nuclear weapons program, its most recent nuclear reactor deals with Russia and China, and its overall nuclear infra- and super-structure, sufficed to fuel the speculations in that

³¹ Turkish stance in that regard is made clear with a press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 5, 1996 stating that “... Greece [was] adopting a more antagonistic attitude not only toward resolving the dispute in the Aegean but toward Turkish-Greek relations overall. In a speech to university students in Thessaloniki Greek Defense Minister Arsenis called for the formulation of alliances with Turkey's neighbors, Russia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in order to pressure Turkey. In conjunction with Minister's new plan of pressuring Turkey through its neighbors, the Minister also ominously announced that Greece has entered into a military agreement which would permit Greek fighter plans to land in Syria and fly over Syrian airspace. Clearly the purpose of such an agreement would be for Greece and Syria to join forces against Turkey.” For details see the web site of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.turkey.org>)

³² A larger discussion on that topic is necessary to highlight many of the obscure points that could not be cited here. However, such a discussion would well exceed the scope and the space of this study.

³³ In the case of Libya, Western intelligence received reliable information in the late Summer of 1994 that the Libyan government was attempting to recruit scientists from the South African biological weapons (BW) project to come to Tripoli to establish a similar program for Libya. US and British intelligence services (CIA and SIS, respectively) mounted a large intelligence operation which was designed to thwart this effort. As part of that operation British and US governments increased the political pressure on President Mandela. The private secret pressure put on the South African government was initially not successful. However, this event leaked to press and revelations appeared in the London *Sunday Times* on February 26, 1995. The political storm then created in South Africa halted the Libyan effort. For details see, James ADAMS, “The Dangerous New world of Chemical and Biological Weapons,” in Brad ROBERTS (ed.), *Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, VA, 1997, pp: 23-42.

regard.³⁴ Iran is also highly suspected to have a chemical weapons arsenal and fresh efforts to enlarge its capability in that field.³⁵

4.2. Threat Posed to Turkey by Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East

The existence of ballistic missiles in the Middle East whose ranges also cover the Turkish territory is a more categorical threat when compared to the one posed by the ambiguity surrounding the status and caliber of mass destruction weapons in the region. In the open source literature there exists detailed graphic presentation of the ballistic missiles as to which country in the world has which category of missiles in its arsenal.³⁶ These sources, however, portray a horrible picture especially when the Middle East is the locus of interest. To date, the profile of the missile arsenals of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt revealed the deployment of especially the Soviet-origin Scud missiles with varying degrees of sophistication and hence varying ranges and payloads. Nonetheless, ongoing research and developments efforts to manufacture indigenously the derivatives of Scuds or non-Scud based missiles with longer ranges and higher payloads do constitute a solid threat to not only the Middle Eastern countries and Turkey, but also to the states in the southern parts of the European continent.³⁷ At a glance, the profile of the missiles deployed in the Middle East looks like the following.

³⁴ With the January 1995 protocol signed between the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI), Russia agreed to construct two 1,000 MW(e) and two 440 MW(e) VVER light-water reactors (LWR) in the Bushehr nuclear site south of Iran by the Persian Gulf. The construction of two Siemens 1,300 MW(e) LWR in the same site were essentially undertaken by the German firm Kraftwerk Union (KWU), but then halted because of the Islamic revolution in Iran. On the other side, China also agreed to install at least two 330 MW(e) LWR in Iran. Being one of the richest countries in proven oil and natural gas reserves, Iran's arguments that it needs that much installed nuclear power capacity to generate electricity is unwarranted.

³⁵ In May 1996, India concluded a \$15 million deal with Iran to construct a plant to produce phosphorus pentasulfide, a chemical that can be used to make pesticide, but has been identified by the Australia Group as a precursor for some chemical weapons. See, James ADAMS, *ibid*.

³⁶ See for example, Yiftah SHAPIR, "Proliferation of Nonconventional Weapons in the Middle East," in, Shlomo GAZIT (ed.), *The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, Westview Press, 1994, pp: 216-238. For a more recent account see Ian O. LESSER & Ashley J. TELLIS, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean*, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996.

³⁷ A comprehensive assessment of the the threat posed by the ballistic missile programs in the Middle East and North Africa to southern European states exist in, Ian O. LESSER & Ashley J. TELLIS, *Strategic Exposure*, *ibid*.

4.2.1. Iraq: All missile development programs of Iraq over 150 km range are cancelled by the United Nations. However, Iraq's allegedly renewed procurement attempts in the field of WMD do also apply to the missile area.³⁸

4.2.2. Iran: First Scud missiles of Iran were gifts from Libya which enabled the former to launch missile attacks on Baghdad beginning in 1985. During the 1988 "War of the Cities" Iran received Scud missiles from North Korea. After 1992, North Korea delivered modified Scud-C missiles whose range exceeds 500 km. Iran's attempt to acquire 1,000 km ranged Nodong-1 (Scud-D) missiles is not materialized to date. Iran is reportedly working on a medium range (800 km) missile called Thondar-68.

4.2.3. Syria: Operational Scud missiles exist in the arsenal of Syria since 1975. The missiles were acquired from the Soviet Union. The first Scud-C missiles were delivered to Syria from North Korea in late 1991 and early 1992. North Korea also provided Syria with Scud-C launchers in 1993. On the other hand, China agreed to sell Syria M-9 missiles having a range of 600 km. However, partly due to the pressure put by the United States on China to prevent the sale, apparently no missiles had been sold.

4.2.4. Libya: First ballistic missiles of Libya were Scuds received from the Soviet Union in the late 1970s. Libya has reportedly been involved in the 1980s in a project called al-Fatah, a liquid-fuelled missile with a range of at least 1,000 km. Progress in the project developed by German engineers was slow. To date, the fate of the missile project is unknown.

4.2.5. Egypt: The first country in the Middle East to operate ballistic missiles in the battlefield was Egypt when it fired three Scuds on Israeli forces in Sinai in October 1973. In the early 1980s, Egypt transferred a few Soviet made Scud missiles to North Korea, which the latter in turn studied the missile through reverse engineering, and then produced and exported them. Egypt is believed to have Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, while the status of the efforts to manufacture indigenously Scud-C missiles is not known for sure.

4.2.6. Israel: First ballistic missile acquired by Israel in the 1960s were based on the French missile Dasseault MD-660. That missile system, then known as Jericho-1, had a range of 480 km. The modified Jericho-2 developed in the mid 1980s had a longer range.

³⁸ UNSCOM sources substantiate these allegations with their findings pertaining to detailed initiatives and contracts of the Iraq's world wide procurement network through front companies. Conversations with a UNSCOM inspector, February 1997.

In 1989 and in 1990 Israel succeeded to launch its experimental satellites, Ofeq-1 and then Ofeq-2 respectively, delivered by Shavit missile launcher. The Shavit missile was reportedly capable of carrying a payload of 1,000 kg over 4,500 km.³⁹

5. Attitude of the Political & Security Elites Towards Nuclear Issues⁴⁰

The fundamental thrust of foreign and security policy of Turkey is to become a state party to the international agreements in the security field so as not only to contribute to their effective implementation, but also to reiterate the guiding principle of its foreign policy: “peace at home and peace in the world.” This guiding principle of the Turkish foreign policy was laid down by the founding father and the first President of the Turkish Republic namely, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Hence, issues pertaining to nuclear arms, nuclear arms control and disarmament are principally seen by the Turkish security elites from this perspective. Accordingly, Turkey has become a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by signing it on 28 January 1969, and subsequently ratifying it on 17 April 1980.⁴¹ Turkey has also become a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and signed the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, while the

³⁹ For details see, Yiftah SHAPIR, *ibid.*

⁴⁰ The views expressed in this part, as the language might imply, partly relate to the personal correspondence of the author with the political and security elites from different institutions in Turkey. Some of these correspondences, however, have taken place during the author’s doctoral research (1993-96) while this paper was out of concern. Nonetheless, regarding the fact that no drastic deviations have occurred in the fundamental thrust of the foreign policy of Turkey since then, those elites’ views are thought to be still relevant to the subject matter of this study and are therefore brought into discussion.

⁴¹ Turkey’s rather late ratification of the NPT may give rise to a question as whether Turkish politicians wanted to keep the nuclear option as a viable one. Conventional wisdom does not suggest such a possibility. However, the traditional weight and hence the undisputed influence of the military on the decision-making process in Turkey about matters relating to national security has probably been a factor that put off ratification for some time. During the 1970s, when interest in nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means was fledgling in neighboring countries like Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkish military elites might not have wanted to give forth an impression with a hasty ratification that Turkey would definitely forgo the nuclear option. Although they had no real intention in that respect, Turkish military elites might have wished to leave that issue ambiguous to serve as a deterrent against the regional rivals and enemies. While this observation holds, the flip side of the coin should also be mentioned. In the second half of 1970s, Turkey went through a chaos which prompted the military intervention in 1980, which, according to many political analysts, rescued the country from the brink of an all-out civil war. Therefore, one should not be surprised if the Turkish Grand National Assembly did not append a high priority to the ratification of the NPT while the country was struggling with anarchy, and where nonproliferation culture did not exist at all. What’s more, the two very negligible-scale nuclear research and training reactors were probably not considered by the policymakers as compelling reasons for speeding up the ratification process or concluding safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

ratification process of the latter is underway. Turkey recently assumed the full member status in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva after a long period of attending its meetings with an observer status. Its willingness to become a full member can be considered as a reflection of the importance attributed by the security elites to disarmament and non-proliferation matters. At the Extension and Review Conference of the NPT held in New York in April/May 1995 Turkey gave its full support to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Turkey also used its influence on the turkic republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus to induce them to behave the same way. As a country that never sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Turkey is striving hard to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and also actively participates in efforts to enhance the IAEA's verification system. Therefore, Turkey pays much attention to the proceedings of a study called "Programme 93+2" as an attempt to make IAEA safeguards inspections more intrusive. In a broader framework, the abolition of nuclear weapons is viewed as a noble aim, from the perspective of Turkish security elites, which should stay on the agenda. Nevertheless, the international context seemingly requires the elites to acknowledge that this aim could only be reached in stages. Furthering the START process, conclusion of the CTBT, a cut-off in the production of fissile material, and the like, are all considered to be such stages.

5.1. Attitude Towards a Test Ban

By joining the Conference on Disarmament, Turkey is "pleased" to have joined the overwhelming majority of nations in the effort to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The complete ban on nuclear testing being the core function of the Treaty is thought by the security elites to be an effective measure to limit nuclear weapons technology. The international monitoring of this ban that the CTBT provides for, is believed to serve as an important confidence building measure amongst the states that are (and will be) party to the Treaty. By the same token, with specific reference to India's position towards the CTBT, Turkish security elites hope that India will review its position and ensure that the Treaty will come into force. This expectation of the security elites is in full conformity with their conviction that consolidation of the CTBT will be an important step on which further efforts would be built towards the eventual goal of elimination of nuclear weapons.

5.2. Attitude Towards a Cut-Off of the Production of Fissile Material

In a period when there are extended discussions regarding the management of tons of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium coming out from weapons dismantlement programs in both the United States and Russia, questioning the significance of a universal cut-off treaty cannot be momentous.⁴² Therefore, Turkish security elites fully support such an eventuality and believe that the entry into force of such a treaty should have secured the ratification of the so-called threshold states like India, Pakistan and Israel. A cut-off treaty is accordingly thought to constitute another significant step towards the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. With special reference to the obvious danger of further nuclearization of the Middle East, Israel being a *de facto* nuclear power, any development that would facilitate the acquisition of the fissile material by other aspiring states in the region is believed to be counter-productive. Hence, a cut-off in the production of fissile material is thought about by the Turkish security elites with regard to its merits to contribute to the non-proliferation goal.

5.3. Attitude Towards a Change in NATO Strategy to “No-First-Use”

At the conceptual level, a change in NATO strategy is considered by the Turkish security elites as a natural consequence of the revolutionary changes taken place in the Soviet Bloc, to which the Alliance was conceptually opposed.⁴³ The original strategic concept of NATO has changed several times during the Cold War receptive to changes and developments in the military balance between two military blocs.⁴⁴ The NATO strategy of the 1990s incorporates the objective of establishing cooperation with the countries in the territory of the former WPO.⁴⁵ The military structure of the Alliance is therefore

⁴² Ongoing discussions in some scholarly circles involve divergent views about the significance of a cut-off treaty while India's position is unambiguous after its rejection of the CTBT.

⁴³ Though no citation of the name of any group of countries as adversaries is found in the text of the North Atlantic Treaty. The geographical delimitation that exist in the text however identifies the defense commitment of the Alliance.

⁴⁴ The so-called “flexible response” strategy of NATO designed and adopted in the 1960s was regarded as defining the characteristics of the Alliance, for it gave the priority to conventional response against a conventional aggression keeping the nuclear weapons as a secondary option that could be resorted during a protracted conflict. Notwithstanding, the previous NATO strategy had relied on “massive retaliation” according to which resorting to nuclear weapons at the first instance would be possible in case an attack occurred against the allied countries.

⁴⁵ The new strategic concept of NATO puts more emphasis on “crisis management” and “conflict prevention” and is mindful of the fact that Central and Eastern Europe are now fertile zones for potential instabilities based on the ethnic compositions of the states of the region.

undergoing changes commensurate with its new strategic concept.⁴⁶ These changes are mostly welcomed by the security elites in Turkey in so far as they reduce the likelihood of a hot conflict. Nevertheless, it must be made clear that, no matter how configured were NATO's strategic concepts throughout the Cold War, they all asserted the right of the Alliance to resort to nuclear weapons at any stage of an aggression. To put it simply, the underlying concept of NATO strategies has always been (and still is) a "first-use" strategy that is also strongly supported by Turkish security elites.⁴⁷ As stressed elsewhere in this study, NATO countries relied on their nuclear capabilities to off-set the superiority of the WPO in conventional weaponry. Because, it was envisaged that NATO might not win a war without resorting to nuclear weapons, whereas the WPO might, with its conventional superiority. Withstanding this argument, Soviet Union declared in 1982, as part of a peace offensive, that they would not be the first to resort to nuclear nuclear forces. Hence, the Soviet "no-first-use" strategy was so initiated.⁴⁸ Turkish security elites considered the Soviet "no-first-use" pledge to be a mere propaganda tool at the time it was initiated.

However, the tide has turned with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the WPO. So did the disproportionate situation between the conventional weapons arsenals of the now potentially rival countries. As NATO survived and goes towards enlargement, Russia undergoes drastic changes. The imbalance in the conventional weapons systems is now in favor of NATO (even excluding the potential contribution of the prospective members) much more than it was the case for the WPO during the Cold War.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Russian military elites felt compelled to revise their decade-old "no-first-use" strategy, and to declare instead, in 1993, that Russia would again reserve its legitimate right to resort to nuclear weapons, in case an aggression occurs

⁴⁶ Accordingly, smaller and more flexible force units at lower levels of readiness with greater mobility are replacing the previous concept that relied on rather static linear defense.

⁴⁷ In order to avoid any confusion or misinterpretation of the terms, it should be clear that NATO's "first use" strategy does by no means imply a "pre-emptive use" which means the use of nuclear weapons before any aggression occurs. Rather, first-use should imply that NATO may be the first to use nuclear weapons, during an aggression, in regard of the fact that no other option might be a better response for defending the NATO territory against the aggressor.

⁴⁸ Telephone conversation with Turkish ambassador Omer Ersun, Ottawa, Canada, April 22, 1997.

⁴⁹ Although a clear cut comparison, in retrospect, between the conventional weapons arsenals of the NATO and WPO countries is hardly possible, it was generally estimated that WPO had a "1.5 to 1" or at best "2 to 1" superiority over NATO. However, the imbalance between NATO (short of new members) and Russia (short of its loose CIS alliance) is said to amount to a "3 to 1" level in favor of NATO in the post-Cold War era. In case of enlargement of NATO, and turning CIS to a military alliance as a reaction, NATO seems to be still better off in all likelihood. Conversations with Turkish military experts, and with Dr. Nikolai SOKOV from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 1997. Dr. SOKOV worked with the Soviet Foreign Ministry in the late 1980s and participated in START I & II negotiations.

by a nuclear-weapons state or an ally of a nuclear-weapons state, regardless of the weapons used by the aggressor. This change in Russian attitude was concomitant with the declaration of the so called “near abroad” doctrine. The mere implication of this is that, during an aggression, given its now inferior position in conventional forces, a feasible alternative for Russia would be to resort to its tactical nuclear weapons. Such an happening can then be a threshold to an exchange of strategic nuclear forces, that is an all-out nuclear war.⁵⁰

Although, simple logic might suggest that, having an indisputable superiority in conventional forces it's now NATO's turn to adopt the “no-first-use” strategy in order to avoid a catastrophe, the answer is not at all a straightforward one. A switch in NATO strategy in that direction may not (and probably will not) bring about a concurrent change in the Russian strategy from “first-use” to again a “no-first-use.” Moreover, Russian “first-use” strategy now is not only an outcome of Russia's inferiority against NATO's conventional posture, but also a culmination of the threat assessments of the Russian military elites from the south. The cumulative threat posed by the nuclear weapons in China, and by the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan, no matter how much weaponized they are, is apparently no less significant a threat to Russia. These two principal reasons withstanding, the traumatic effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact on the state of mind of the Russian security elites worth taking equally serious.⁵¹ Therefore, a would be “no-first-use” strategy of NATO will have a limited significance in the short term.⁵² On the other hand, NATO has its own constraints as far as the threat of proliferation of WMD especially in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean basin is concerned. It is anticipated that, within a decade, “Western European capitals will be within the range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa and the Middle East,” and that the “southern members of NATO will be the first to feel the

⁵⁰ Strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and Russia can be put on target in ten minutes. This means that, the world is ten minutes away from the Cold War contingencies. Conversations with James GOODBY when he paid a visit to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 1996.

⁵¹ Russian elites have lost almost all of their confidence in their Western counterparts, especially because of the assurances given to them during the unification of Germany, now proved to be void, as regards the future composition of NATO. Therefore, even if NATO warrants a “no-first-use”, Russians would probably expect further concrete steps from the West to rebuild their confidence. This, however, may turn out to be a matter of decades. Conversations with Nikolai SOKOV.

⁵² It may, however, contribute to confidence building efforts between the parties, namely NATO and Russia. In other words, NATO's switch to a “no-first-use” strategy is considered by the Russians to be a “necessary but not sufficient condition.” Conversations with Nikolai SOKOV.

political and military consequences of proliferation trends on Europe's periphery."⁵³ Hence, in June 1996, NATO foreign and defense ministers endorsed a comprehensive approach to counter the military risks posed by such threats.⁵⁴ NATO's effort to adapt itself to meet the challenges of the new security environment produced guidelines for appropriate responses to proliferation. Overarching principles to guide NATO's defense response envisaged, among others, to "maintain *freedom of action* and demonstration to any potential adversary that the alliance will not be coerced by the threat or use of WMD."⁵⁵

In view of the fact that a change in NATO strategy to "no-first-use" will not induce an immediate reciprocal change in Russia's current "first-use" strategy, while, on the other hand, the proliferation of WMD in the proximity of NATO is likely to constitute a more serious threat in the near future than it does now, the exigency and viability of such a change sounds questionable.⁵⁶ Therefore, Turkish security elites do not see any prospect for a switch to a "no-first-use" strategy, at least for the foreseeable future. Although dramatic (and also favorable) changes have taken place in the security environment of Turkey, credibility of the nuclear posture and hence deterrence of NATO compounded with the implicit "first use" strategy of the Alliance is of utmost importance for the Turkish security elites.

5.5. Attitude Towards a START III Treaty & Inclusion of French, British and Chinese Nuclear Arsenals in International Nuclear Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties

Concluding the START III Treaty, though not likely to be realized soon, is thought to be the ultimate level, for the foreseeable future, of strategic force reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and Russia. While START II still awaits ratification by the Russian Duma, the mutual reduction level designated as 3,500 strategic nuclear

⁵³ See, Ronald D. ASMUS, F. Stephen LARRABEE and Ian O. LESSER, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks," *NATO Review*, May 1996, No: 3, pp: 25-31.

⁵⁴ This issue is explicitly cited in the Communiqué (para. 29) released after the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session, on 13 June 1996. For full documentation see, *NATO Review*, September 1996, No: 5, pp: 32-35.

⁵⁵ For a larger discussion see, Ashton B. CARTER & David B. OMAND, "Countering the Proliferation Risks: Adapting the Alliance to the New Security Environment," *NATO Review*, September 1996, No: 5, pp: 10-15 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶ It is nonetheless interesting to note that, in the post-Cold War era, both NATO and Russia have to pay even more attention to factors beyond each other's intentions and capabilities in defining their new defense and security identities that may have serious consequences on both parties.

warheads to remain in the arsenals of two sides, is hoped to be further reduced to 2,000 warheads level with the START III Treaty. As for the idea of including French, British and Chinese nuclear arsenals in international arms limitation and reduction treaties, Turkish political elites' view is endorsing. Such an occurrence is regarded as a positive step in the right direction that would contribute to the eventual goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons from the Earth's surface. But, Turkish security elites are well aware of the perspective of the three nuclear-weapons-states in mention which are fundamentally concerned with the huge gap between their nuclear stockpile and those of the United States and Russia. Therefore, Turkish elites do not expect any move from the "smaller" three to join the "big" two in arms limitation talks.

5.6. Attitude Towards the Transfer of Fissile Material to Civilian Purposes

According to some scholarly work and technical reports, in the years ahead hundreds of tons of fissile material, mainly in the form of weapon-grade plutonium (Pu-239) and highly enriched uranium (U-235), will be considered excess as a result of drastic cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia provided the series of START Treaties are fully implemented.⁵⁷ The issue of utmost importance then will certainly be the destination of these excess fissile materials. Comprehensive studies are underway as to what would be the safest and most feasible ways to manage the excess plutonium.⁵⁸ HEU is much less problematic to dispose of because it can be diluted with natural uranium to obtain low enriched uranium (LEU). It goes without saying that strict controls and concomitant application of safeguards are necessary no matter which way is to be preferred by the experts for the disposal of excess fissile materials that will be accumulated over the next two decades. A side benefit of realization of effective transfer of fissile materials from weapons to civilian purposes is that it will facilitate the acquisition of low-enriched uranium or MOX fuel by less industrialized countries at cheaper rates for a longer period in order to generate electricity in their civilian nuclear plants. Turkey, being such a country which recently launched an offer to international companies to make their bids for one or two nuclear power plants, is likely to welcome such a transition from weapons to civilian use of fissile materials.

⁵⁷ For an excellent discussion on these matters and a compilation of useful information with regard to the estimated plutonium and HEU stocks all over the world see, David ALBRIGHT, Frans BERKHOUT and William WALKER, *Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: Inventories, Capabilities and Policies*, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, Oxford and New York, 1997.

⁵⁸ See, for instance, *Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options*, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1995.

5.7. Attitude Towards a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe

This issue is likely to be the most controversial one between Turkey and the United States within the NATO alliance. Moreover, due to the reasons that will be cited below the negative stance of Turkish security elites towards proposals to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the enlargement of NATO may give rise to a dilemma. It has repeatedly been declared by the Clinton administration that NATO expansion was a high priority matter for the US interests. Hence, especially the United States and Germany closely followed the issue.⁵⁹ Turkish political and security elites have also made it explicit in several instances that, as a NATO ally, Turkey would not oppose (though not necessarily endorse) the idea of NATO enlargement⁶⁰ and hope that such a process would help consolidate the democracies of former communist countries as they become integrated into the European system. In this manner, the former perceived threat from the East is believed to unrecoverably disappear. And, on 28 September 1995, NATO published a report on the enlargement of the Alliance which, in some way, has proven that all the member countries were in support of enlargement, though the reasons for enlargement and the format as to whom would be the new members were not made clear. However, Russia's reaction to NATO expansion in general, and to the report in particular, was clear and an opposing one. Russian officials and politicians have flatly rejected the idea, and on many occasions stated that they would view NATO expansion as a threat that would necessitate taking counter measures.⁶¹ Russia's unambiguous position compelled the NATO partners to come up with solutions. Hence, the proposal to establish a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe, once tabled by Belarus

⁵⁹ It goes without saying that the enlargement of NATO towards the East will contribute the most to Germany's security as there will be a buffer zone between its territory and its historic adversary, Russia.

⁶⁰ It has surfaced during the revision of this chapter that, Turkish political and security elites seemed to be very uncomfortable with the "unequal" and "unfair" treatment of their Western European counterparts with regard to Turkey's full membership to the EU, vis-a-vis the other prospective members from the Eastern Europe. Hence, Turkish political elites, if not all of them, have reportedly made their affirmative vote for NATO expansion conditional on Turkey's full membership not only to the WEU, but also to the EU. Such a development is observed to have exacerbated the already strained relations between Turkey and NATO because of the dispute over the issue of allocation of NATO assets to the WEU. This dimension of the Turkish-European relations will be discussed later in the chapter. As of April 1997, there seems to be no easy way out of the deadlock.

⁶¹ See, for instance, then foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's statement at NATO Council, Noordwijk, 31 May 1995; and "No Role for Russia in a Security Order that Includes an Expanded NATO," (The Russia Council's NATO Report), *Transition*, Vol: 1, No: 23 (15 December 1995), pp: 27-33. Cited in Ali L. KARAOSMANOGLU, *ibid.*, p 8.

at the United Nations General Assembly in 1990, gained the endorsement of the scholarly circles in the United States.⁶² Other proposals also followed a similar pattern of thinking and suggested to make the region free of tactical nuclear weapons, which practically meant a *de facto* NWFZ. In this manner, it is believed that Russia might be persuaded that NATO enlargement would not function against it, and that it would not threaten Russia's security interests with the deployment of nuclear weapons. The official reaction of Russia is not yet clear if it would be satisfied with that much, or would it ask further concessions from the West.⁶³ Even if nuclear weapons are not to be deployed in the territory of the prospective members of NATO, imbalance created in conventional weapons systems will still disturb Russia. This may lead Russians to take counter measures. Among the concrete steps likely to be taken by the Russian administration against a would-be NATO enlargement could be: the transformation of the Commonwealth of Independent States into a military alliance; rejection of START II Treaty; withdrawal from the CFE; and the reconsideration of the military doctrine and foreign policy approach of Russia. All these options and others that might follow would undoubtedly be detrimental to Western security including the security of Turkey.

From the perspective of Turkish security elites, however, proposal to establish a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe coupled with the unwillingness of countries in the region to accept nuclear weapons on their soil, in case they are invited to NATO as full members, is not thought to be an acceptable development. Among other things, NATO membership as a frontline state brought too many risks as well as responsibilities to Turkey during the Cold War. The Turkish military did its best to attain training and readiness levels set by the Alliance. Such an accomplishment meant a lot of sacrifices for Turkey in many respects. Moreover, Turkey was the playground of two superpowers during the Cuban missile crisis. Turkey might have suffered severe consequences of the brinkmanship game between the Americans and the Soviets unless wisdom prevailed and the crisis halted.⁶⁴

⁶² See, for example, William C. POTTER & David FISCHER, "Nuclear Free; Better Than NATO," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Internet Web Site (<http://cns.miis.edu>).

⁶³ Alexiy ARBATOV, Deputy Chairman of Defense Committee of the Russian Duma said, during his visit to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in November 1996, that top Russian officials were viewing the proposal for a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe to be of marginal contribution to Russian security considerations.

⁶⁴ The Kennedy administration agreed to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey without consulting such a strategic decision with its Turkish counterparts. As stated in a previous footnote, Turkish-American relations were embittered in the mid-1960 because of the "Johnson's letter." Concomitant with the letter, news leaked, presumably from the Soviet embassy in Ankara, that Kennedy had agreed to a trade off of the Jupiters without informing Turks during the Cuban crisis. Removal of the missiles had already served to widen the gap between the right and the left in the

Therefore, Turkish security elites cannot appreciate the political concerns of the prospective members of NATO in that respect. Neither can they attribute such a luxury to these countries, which will certainly be in a privileged and more advantageous position than some of the other members. Because, the elites believe that, in case Central and Eastern European countries are admitted to NATO with a nuclear-weapons-free status they will, on the one hand, enjoy the status of being full members, thus getting the full security guarantees of the Alliance. On the other hand, they will not put themselves at risk by deploying nuclear weapons on their soil, while such an occurrence is declared to be one of the biggest concerns of Russia in its opposition to the enlargement of NATO.

Withstanding the contingencies involving the Russian reaction noted above, Turkey's opposition to a would-be NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe may still require a revision. It should be acknowledged by the Turkish political and security elites that, if NATO is to expand, the least possible compromise between Russia and the NATO countries headed by the United States would be the non-deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of the new members. That is a *de facto* or *de jure* NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe. This being the essence of the dilemma that Turkey is likely to face, however, Turkish security elites prefer not to express their opposition loudly at this premature stage so as not to prompt the counter-reaction of their foremost ally, namely the United States. Besides, the practicality and feasibility of a NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe is still being discussed in political and scholarly circles in the United States, and the official stance of the Clinton administration towards the proposal is yet to be clarified.

6. Implications of the New European Defense Identity for Turkey's Security

A "Euro-deterrent" which characterizes the essence of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is also likely to have an impact on the security of Turkey in the years ahead. The basis of the ESDI is to be found in the Treaty of European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992. Hence, with regard to implementing a common foreign

domain of domestic politics. The leftists had argued that the rightist government sold the country to the Americans. But, with the Johnson letter, coupled with the revelations in the press about the missile trade off, anti-Americanism and neutralist sentiments grew on the part of liberals and socialists alike. In the military domain, however, things went rather slowly, if not smoothly. Nevertheless, by 1970, the Turkish government announced, probably after consultations with the military, that the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954 with the United States was abrogated. From then on, with alacrity, the Turkish State has turned the bases on its soil to use conditional upon its own political will. For further details see, Nur B. CRISS, "... The Jupiter Affair.." *ibid.*, See also, Jerrold I. SCHECTER & Vyacheslav V. LUCHKOV (eds.), *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1990, cited in CRISS, *ibid.*

and security policy (CFSP) Article J-4 of the Maastricht Treaty reads as follows: The CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to common defence.” Accordingly, the Treaty requests the Western European Union (WEU) as an integral part of the European Union (EU) “to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.” Thus, it was envisaged that the WEU would be developed as the defense component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, the WEU was assigned a central role in formulating the common European defense policy and carrying forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its operational role. It was therefore estimated that the WEU would have access to NATO’s operational assets, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, in its pursuit of the common foreign and security policy of the European Union. Such an approach also gained support of the Atlantic Alliance with a view to enhance the triangular relationship between the WEU, EU, and NATO.

It is crucial to reiterate, however, that the essence of a European security and defense identity relies to a great extent on the availability of the operational assets of the North Atlantic Alliance of which Turkey is a full member and its affirmative vote is required for a decision in this direction to be taken in the Atlantic Council. On the other hand, Turkey is only an associate member of the WEU, as full membership is conditional on EU membership according to the terms of the Brussels Treaty. Nevertheless, Turkey wants to be a full member of the WEU for several reasons. First, there is indeed no mention of the so-called associate membership in the text of the Brussels Treaty, which leaves Turkey’s status devoid of a legal basis. Second, Turkey, as an associate member can participate in WEU meetings -unless its participation is denied if half of the members object- and can express opinions, but cannot have an ultimate influence on the decisions taken. Such decisions, however, may have serious consequences for Turkey because, NATO’s operational assets including those of Turkey can be incorporated into the contingency plans. Thus, Turkish political and security elites regard the associate member status as unfair and inadmissible. Therefore, Turkey insists on being accepted as a full member of the WEU so as to cast its affirmative vote for enabling the WEU to use NATO’s operational assets. However, Greece as a full member of the EU and WEU does not accept Turkey’s full membership to the WEU, based on its well-known national strategy towards Turkey. Important progress however achieved recently. On April 15, 1997, the WEU agreed to a deal giving non-members Turkey and Norway a full role in any operations launched with NATO equipment. Greece dropped its opposition to a cooperation accord

between NATO and the WEU that would give Turkey a say in WEU operations involving the alliance. Under the agreement between the 10-member European defense body and NATO, associate members of the WEU, including Turkey, will be able to participate on the same basis as full members in WEU operations using NATO resources.

7. Conclusion

This chapter mostly considered the military aspects of nuclear related matters as they pertained to Turkey's foreign relations and its role in world politics. However, civilian aspects of the very same issue area and their implications in Turkey's foreign and economic relations should also be extensively studied. Because, it seems that, after long deliberations over the last decade, Turkey is finally nearing the end in its attempt to benefit from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.⁶⁵ Therefore, Turkey should become much more acquainted with a variety of dimensions of running large-scale nuclear utilities. But, prior to these, Turkey should not risk another backlash in its initiatives to acquire nuclear facilities, as it so happened in the past.⁶⁶

Turkey had attempts to exploit nuclear energy for peaceful uses in the second half of 1980s, and held serious talks with Canadian and German firms to that effect, also almost wrapped up a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina. Nevertheless, all of its attempts later proved to be void. For instance, the Canadian firm AECL which had formed a consortium with a Turkish firm ENKA won a nuclear plant contract that was later signed by the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal. However, the bid was withdrawn in response to pressure from Western countries which were concerned

⁶⁵To this end, Turkey requested bids for establishing rather large scale nuclear installations. In 1995, the Turkish State Power Board (TEAS) hired the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) to examine the feasibility of renewing Turkey's project at Akkuyu. A review process was scheduled for completion by mid-1996. A contractor will be selected by 1998, with construction scheduled to begin in late 1998. Atomic Energy of Canada is expected to offer a 680 MW CANDU-6 heavy water reactor, and Siemens of Germany is said to offer 1,400 MW pressurized water reactor. See, Mark HIBBS, "Turkey Expected to Request Bids for PWR Project in Coming Weeks," *Nucleonics Week*, March 21, 1996, pp: 1-2. According to most recent news in December 1996, the Turkish government plans to accept bids for the nuclear plant to be built either as single unit with a capacity of 1,200 MW or two equal units each of a capacity of 600 MW. The cost of the plant is estimated to be \$1.5 billion.

⁶⁶ A study including a survey on the past attempts of Turkey for installing nuclear power reactors is scheduled to appear in, Mustafa KIBAROGLU, "Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power & the Shadow of Allegations of a Pakistani Connection" (working title) *The Nonproliferation Review*, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA., Spring/Summer 1997, (forthcoming).

that Turkey might build a nuclear bomb with a plant based on CANDU technology.⁶⁷ With Argentina, on the other hand, much more elaborate talks were held over the years. In May 1988, Argentina and Turkey signed a nuclear technology cooperation agreement hoping to build reactors and nuclear power plants in Turkey. In September 1989, Turkish Atomic Energy Organization discussed the modalities of establishing a plant near Ankara with its Argentine counterpart Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica. A year later, both countries agreed to create a joint venture firm that would build a 25 MW(th) nuclear reactor in each country. The deal involved the total transfer of technology for the construction of the reactor. This agreement as well, was later shelved and never materialized. Because, the possibility of a transfer of complete nuclear fuel cycle to Turkey raised serious concerns in especially the United States, not the least in Greece, Israel, and India, all of whom in turn fuelled the US fears so as to thwart such a development.⁶⁸ Putting aside the obvious concerns of Greece,⁶⁹ the fears of Israel, India and the United States converged to the possibility of a re-transfer of the technology and materials that would be acquired by Turkey, to a third country, namely Pakistan. There were already speculations about a Turkish-Pakistani connection in the nuclear field. It was asserted that Pakistan used Turkey as a go-between to obtain nuclear know-how and materials, where the former would in return share with the latter the nuclear know-how it would thence acquire, including the area of nuclear wapons development. Quite a number of similar unfounded speculations appeared in international media all through the 1980s and also 1990s. It was no surprising however that the sources of information were either Greece or India in most cases, each being the bloody enemy of one of the parties which they were accusing for being engaged in illicit nuclear business.⁷⁰ To date, however, no evidence was found to substantiate such an engagement. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs always denied these allegations and stated that Turkey fulfilled "with great care" its obligations under the NPT, and dismissed reports that Turkey would sell material to Pakistan for nuclear arm production.⁷¹

⁶⁷ See, the Turkish daily, *Tercuman* (Istanbul), November 06, 1987, p. 10. Source: CNS Databases, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA.

⁶⁸ For a detailed account on these matters see, Mustafa KIBAROGLU, *Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power ...*

⁶⁹ For a Greek viewpoint in that particular issue see, Thanos DOKOS, "Greece," in Harald MULLER (ed.), *Nuclear Export Controls in Europe*, European Interuniversity Press, Brussels, 1995, p. 208.

⁷⁰ See, for instance, *Delhi Domestic Service*, March 23, 1988; *The Times of India* (Bombay), July 11, 1988, p. 18; and, *I Kathimerini* (Athens), December 29, 1991, p. 1. CNS Databases.

⁷¹ Foreign Ministry's spokesman Ambassador Inal BATU made this statement during a press conference held on October 28, 1987. CNS Databases.

Although unsubstantiated, such allegations have stalled the development of nuclear industry in Turkey. The US Congress has become very sensitive about the issue and did its best to obstruct Turkey's initiatives in that area.⁷² Had the nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina been materialized, the construction of nuclear installations would be nearing completion soon. Although the reactors that would be installed in cooperation with Argentina would only be partially effective in meeting the ever-growing energy needs of Turkey, they would still be useful in introducing the benefits of peaceful exploitation of nuclear power in the country. Alas, in our day, Turkey needs great amounts of electricity generation capacity anew, and suffers from electricity blackouts that have a very serious negative impact, among others, on its industrial productivity.⁷³ This should not have been the case for a country like Turkey which has always been loyal to its NPT commitments as well as to its IAEA obligations, not to mention its "staunch ally" status in NATO, a good reason to forgo a nuclear adventure. There are too many other reasons for Turkey to disregard the nuclear option for military purposes. And, so did Turkey. However, suffice it to say that, Turkish political and security elites should seriously consider the circumstances that misperception may cause great harm to Turkey's interests. Unless Turkey's intentions and capabilities are unequivocally understood in the Western world, similar speculations may surface again and again and may take hostage Turkey's potential benefits in the nuclear field. In order to not to leave any room for gossips, rumors etc.. transparency is essential. Not only transparency of agreements or contracts, but also of transactions *per se*. One simple way to attain this, would be, *inter alia*, to accede to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and to adapt its guidelines that regulate world wide nuclear exports including dual use materials. Such a move would certainly relieve Turkey from the suspicion that it acts as a mediator between the suppliers and Pakistan.⁷⁴

Turkish ruling elites should also consider with great care the safety and security of nuclear installations, and hence should raise relevant cadres of personnels endowed with

⁷² In his article published in *The Washington Post* on June 24, 1992, US senator John GLENN admits that, an amendment to the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1977 proposed by senator Stuart Symington and himself, to deal with the issue of nuclear proliferation, especially in regards to Pakistan, should have envisaged, among other things, to stop aid to Turkey because of its alleged involvement in aiding Pakistan in its acquisition of uranium enrichment equipment. CNS Databases.

⁷³ Although great achievements had been attained in electricity generating capacity in Turkey in the 1980s, many of the projects for exploiting the hydroelectric potential of Turkey were either shelved or slated since the early 1990s mainly due to the difficulties in financing and domestic political unrest. Even if all the hydroelectric potential of the country is used, supply will still fall short to meet the demand in the early 2000s. For a graphic account on this see, Mustafa KIBAROGLU, *Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power...*

⁷⁴ Ibid.

qualitative and quantitative requirements of using highly sensitive technologies and materials by the time operations in the utilities begin. On the other hand, the decade-old Chernobyl disaster should remind the ruling elites of the probable unwanted consequences of peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy, e.g., its environmental damage. Not the least, the possibility of a hostile attack against the nuclear installations with a specific goal of causing an unacceptable damage to Turkey should also be seriously considered, and precautions commensurate with the risks should be taken.

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